European Constitution in the future
by Alfred Marleku
No doubt that European Union is one of the most successful creations in the history of political institutions. The most wonderful achievement was coordination of the policies of many European countries that has helped to exceed war and to make it undesirable for countries that were swore enemies throughout the centuries. There, permanently, have been dealings in improving standards, in all areas of life of millions of people. Integration and unifications of many policies, in economical also in political sphere, has deeply changed the way Europeans see their relationships to one another, to their governments, and to the outside world. To improve furthermore integration between Member States of EU, former France president Valery Giscard d’Estaing, proposed to Europe one common constitution. Ironically, it was exactly France the first state that rejected that constitution, followed later on by Netherlands also.1 Currently, Europe is passing through a period which is called ‘time for reflection’, a period of time when Europe ought to thing how to coordinate actions in order to proceed with constitution issue in prospect.
This essay is an attempt to deal with question of European constitution in future. Firstly, we will try to identify main issues that influenced more to make citizens/voters in France and Netherlands to reject the European constitution. Secondly, we will give our ideas/suggestion what should be changed in current constitution during this – indefinite – ‘period of reflection’, in order to create the possibility that European constitution in the future to be satisfactory for all Member States of European Union.
EU Constitution is simply too long document
The constitutional document created by former France president Valery Giscard d’Estaing, in many aspects, fails to reach the objectives for which it was planned to. More exactly, the constitution suffers from three wide categories of insufficiency. First, the draft constitution is to long,2 in sense it has to much text. Consequently, it fails to be clear enough with the aim of being understandable for people. Second, the document fails to cure the ‘democratic deficit’, by which the Union has so long been characterized.3 Third, and most important, the document affect too greatly on the sovereignty of the individual Member States; by proposing types of integration that would narrow piece countries of some of their most essential functions, the treaty constitution puts the Member States in the impossible position of choosing between Europe’s integration and their own independence.3 For these – among other – reasons, two important members of European Union, France and Netherlands, voted against the European Constitution on their referendums.
European Constitution has over 300 pages. This kind of constitution can simply consider too long. It is well known that constitution is document that will be considered as body of fundamental principles and rules.4 If constitution takes that much paper to discuss, so called, fundamental values and to make clear institutional construction, it is possible that the values are not too much fundamental and the institutional structure is not clear enough.
European constitution in the future should be much shorter and much more comprehensible that current form. It is logical that in this existing structure, with this length, the majority of the European public has not read it and does not know what is in it. The creator’s of future European Constitution, maybe, should take as example US constitution because, in contrast to European Constitution, the U.S. Constitution is much shorter and it is clear enough to understand.
European leaders should remember that constitution should be written in order to serve to the people. Current constitution does not serve European citizens; it serves much more European institutions. Moreover, is very important to emphasize the fact that an effective European constitutional document in the future should not only set out the core rights of citizens, and the basic structures of government, but ought to do so in a way that is clear, concise, definitive, and accessible fore European citizens.6
The European Constitution fails to cure the ‘democratic deficit’
European constitution failed to cure the ‘democratic deficit’ from which is suffering form long time. It failed in sense of developing the legitimacy for their doings and initiatives. For an instance, The EU founding treaties have not been directly ratified by its citizens; or the fact that the European citizens are unclear how the EU reaches its decisions.7 What is more important, EU lacks European wide institutions, such as media and political parties that will really animate public debate. Remember that, when USA ratified its constitution it was intensively and cleverly debated; moreover, the ratification struggle in New York produced the Federalist Papers.8
One of the primary goals of constitutional project was to bring the Union closer to the people. The idea was to create a really pan-European politics. This meant untangling the definitions and job descriptions of the EU’s many institutions and explaining in clear terms what the main roles of the Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, and other institutions are to be.8 Unfortunately, current constitution makes the Union not as much transparent and less democratic, at the same time it fails to sketch out properly the powers of EU institutions in relation to both each other and the Member States.
One of the characteristic of constitutions is that it establishes and defines the fundamental relationships among relevant institutions. The proper constitution must ensure equilibrium/balance of power between institutions, in sense of stopping one institution dominating the others. This notion is at the heart of the ‘checks and balances’ concept which characterizes the American constitutional system.10
In this context, the European constitution largely fails to establish such equilibrium/balance between its institutions; such ‘checks and balances’ system is extremely needed for European institutions. European constitution in the future should define properly competences between Union institution, in sense of installing this system of checking and balancing between each other. All this should be done in a way that is understandable for European citizens, because throughout its entire existence European institutions have been little recognized by ordinary Europeans. For these reasons, European experts should create one constitution that will properly modulate lack of transparency in its institution and its dubious democratic credentials.11
Another factor that would contribute positively in conception of European constitution in the future is animation of public debate. It is extremely dangerous for Europeans leaders to take any decision without legitimacy of people. It is very important for the future of Europe to create one healthy public space/sphere, because only through open debate Europe can further its integration and cohesiveness. In this context, media and telecommunication technological system plays huge role; they will enable Europe to create new, common cultural and political system.12
State Sovereignty vs. European integration
Usually constitutions are written by single, independent states. In juridical history we rarely find a case when group of sovereign states try to establish constitution to govern relations among them. Yet 25 European countries, none of which has any intention of stopping to be sovereign and independent, are attempting to establish a common constitution. In substance, they are negotiating a framework under which they will voluntarily abandon some of their autonomy in order to achieve greater things collectively.13
Here lays the most significant mistake of the European constitution. In its current form, the document asks the Member States to give up too much, and in so doing threatens their very sovereignty. Far from confining itself to the types of co-operation – economic, environmental, and public health – on which the EU has focused over the years, the constitution endeavors to bring into its embrace a broad range of highly sensitive areas of public policy.14 In this manner, constitution challenges the conceptual foundation of the European Union: the integration of sovereign states, co-operating where it benefits them, acting individually where it does not. Therefore, in principle, the document of European Constitution proposes the ‘supranationalization’ of areas of policy that simply it is very hard to supranationalized.15
The clearest example of the document’s contravention on state sovereignty takes place in the area of foreign policy. In EU constitution is said that the Union takes responsibility for the foreign and defense policies of all 25 current and future Member States.16 The constitution would permit the EU to define the strategic interests of the Member States as a whole; it would create a foreign minister for Europe and charge that individual with managing the formation and implementation of Union foreign policy,17 as well as representing the Union diplomatically.18 Here is the moment when European constitution creators face a huge problem, maybe the biggest one. This kind of co–ordination and uniformity among current EU members is very hard to be achieved; simply because they have different interests, very often extremely opposite from each other.
To illustrate properly the diversity in foreign policy of European Member States we will take one recent example, which is very simple. The debate about the war in Iraq reflected a huge discordance among Member States in foreign policy approaches. For an instance, Germany, France, and Belgium opposed the war. They demanded the permission of the United Nations (according to international law these states where right). For the same issue, other countries, such United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, were for the Americans to go to war in Iraq without United Nations (UN) authorization/approval. On other hand, the situation of differences in attitudes in foreign policies was more delicate with States in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were largely supportive of the Americans. In one aspect, these countries represent similar foreign policy as Americans do.
These differences clearly show that, actually, it is, nearly impossible to co–ordinate, better to say, to fusion foreign policy of sovereign Member States of European Union – among others – for this relevant reason: it is, nearly, impossible for states that have permanent seats on the Security Council, the United Kingdom and France, to merge from two seats into one. Hereto, up till now that is unthinkable to happen; neither the British nor the French would ever sacrifice their permanent Security Council seat for further integration among states in Europe.
To take in consideration what have been said above, it is very hard to imagine, in near future, one document that will unify important national values of Member States of EU – foreign politics for an instance – in this level what proposes current constitutional document. It is necessary that European leaders to take some pragmatic steps that can help the EU to improve its performance in many areas. Fore an instance, the first step would be improvement Europe’s overall economic performance; second step, to get better its employment record; and third one, to ease its social malaise.19 These important steps, would, for sure, strengthen European unity and one-by-one creates an environment more favorable for new European initiative for one common constitution.
Conclusion
To conclude, no doubt that European integration has been a wonderful achievement, and, of course, it is rational choice for Europeans to thing how to sustain and at the same time to strengthen cohesiveness between each other furthermore. Europe certainly needs to open itself up to the people and to clarify what its institutions are meant to do. In fact, in order to make this possible, in a proper way, Europe it might even need a constitution; but, one thing is for sure not this kind of constitution. Current constitution has many fallacies, it easily can be consider as an unfortunate document. It is too long, too unclear, too uncertain, and too inaccessible. By error it gathers to much power in the centre, in Brussels. Most horrible of all, it proposes, to Member States, to do things upon which principle is created European Union that today exist – giving up from their State sovereignty. It is important to emphasize that upon this principle – state sovereignty – was based whole European integration, at least till now.
After the collapse of two Member States, France and Netherlands, to say ‘Yes’ to the constitution, Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Great Britain, suggested a period of time when Europeans would think how to proceed with constitutional issue in the future; he called this period ‘time for reflection’. State Representatives of the European Union should now require a rewrite/change the constitution, in light of their principles and their common interests toward Europe also. With out a doubt, the European Union is passing crucial moments in its history. It depends on how Europe’s leaders will formulate/construct the EU constitution now, which will influence European future in, at least, forty or fifty other years.
--------------------------------------
Notes;
1. To date, the Constitution has been ratified by 15 of the 25 member states, which include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. On the other hand, it can’t come into force unless it is ratified by all 25. (Pavel Telička, “A future for an EU constitution?” http://www.cbw.cz/phprs/2006062604.html, last time visited: 17/07/2006).
2. Jonathan S. Kallmer, “The Draft European Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 284, Issue: 1656, Contemporary Review Company, 2004, p. 1+
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Jonathan S. Kallmer, “The Draft European Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 284, Issue: 1656, Contemporary Review Company, 2004, p. 1+
7. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, Palgrave, Great Britain, 2001, p. 51-53
8. Carl J. Fridrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America, Ginn, Boston, 1950, pp. 189-200
9. Andrew Borowiec, “EU Expansion Sows Doubts about the Future: Rift between Rich and Poor Nations Widens”, World and I, Volume: 19, Issue: 10, News World Communications, 2004
10. Carl J. Fridrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America, Ginn, Boston, 1950, pp. 185-186
11. David Pryce-Jones, “European Union-a Disaster in the Making”, Commentary, Volume: 103, Issue: 6, American Jewish Committee, 1997, p. 32+
12. Obrad Savic, “Media and Normative Concept of Europe”, from READER, Media and Normative Concept of Europe: On the Road to European Membership, Prishtina, Kosova, 2006
13. Pascal Fontaine, Europe in 12 lessons, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Belgium, 2004, pp. 21-23
14. Jonathan S. Kallmer, “The Draft European Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 284, Issue: 1656, Contemporary Review Company, 2004, p. 1+
15. Jonathan S. Kallmer, “The Draft European Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 284, Issue: 1656, Contemporary Review Company, 2004, p. 1+
16. Peter C. Hylarides, “Europe and the New Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 285, Issue: 1666, Contemporary Review Company, November 2004, p. 269+
17. In addition, the draft constitution would provide one common defense policy, integrating and harmonizing the military capabilities of the Member States and providing for concerted action in the case of conflict. Also, the draft constitution would create a Union armaments agency tasked with harmonizing operational requirements, strengthening the defense sector’s industrial and technological base, and coordinating procurement practices.
18. Peter C. Hylarides, “Europe and the New Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 285, Issue: 1666, Contemporary Review Company, November 2004, p. 269+
19. Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, “The End of Europe?” From: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2005
Bibliography
B o r o w i e c, A n d r e w. “EU Expansion Sows Doubts about the Future: Rift between Rich and Poor Nations Widens”, World and I, Volume: 19, Issue: 10, News World Communications, 2004
C o h e n – T a n u g i, L a u r e n t. “The End of Europe?” From: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2005
F o n t a I n e, P a s c a l. Europe in 12 lessons, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Belgium, 2004
F r i d r i c h, C a r l J. Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America, Ginn, Boston, 1950
H a g u e, R o d & M a r t i n H a r r o p. Comparative Government and Politics, Palgrave, Great Britain, 2001
H y l a r I d e s, P e t e r C. “Europe and the New Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 285, Issue: 1666, Contemporary Review Company, November 2004
K a l l m e r, J o n a t h a n S. “The Draft European Constitution”, Contemporary Review, Volume: 284, Issue: 1656, Contemporary Review Company, 2004
P r y c e – J o n e s, D a v i d. “European Union-a Disaster in the Making”, Commentary, Volume: 103, Issue: 6, American Jewish Committee, 1997
S a v i c, O b r a d. “Media and Normative Concept of Europe”, from READER, Media and Normative Concept of Europe: On the Road to European Membership, Prishtina, Kosova, 2006
T e l I č k a, P a v e l. “A future for an EU constitution?” http://www.cbw.cz/phprs/2006062604.html, last time visited: 17/07/2006
Saturday, January 27, 2007
The Watchdog Role of the Media
The Watchdog Role of the Media - Media as the Fourth Estate
By Leonard Ibrahimi
The watchdog conception, according to which, the media is supposed to serve as a controller of government, is one among the oldest main beliefs in journalism. The term ‘fourth estate’, the press’ role in being a ‘watchdog’ that will control the government was reputedly coined by Edmund Burke, in late-eighteenth century in England to refer to the political power possessed by the press of that time, on a same level with the other three ‘estates’ of power in the British realm: Lords, Church and Commons.[1]
In the beginning, the idea of the press as the ‘fourth estate’ was considered as an independent check on the activities of the state, particularly government. On the other hand, the development of the watchdog role goes further than the borders of government investigation to take account of many other institutions of societal power, including powerful individuals, who may have no official relationship with public office.
This essay will aim to explain the ‘watchdog’ role of the media; in particular it will deal with issues like: Social Responsibility Theory, current trends of media agenda setting, and how media fulfills its role in the society and how it helps opinion make wise and informed decisions. In countries where democracy is fragile, there is less emphasis on the ‘watchdog’ role of the media; circumstances dictate such a thing. On the other hand, in the democratic countries, in the societies with a high level of political culture, the ‘watchdog’ role of the media is highlighted very strongly. Media are considered as a ‘fourth estate’, as a powerful ‘watchdog’, which is used for revealing mistreatments of state authority, in particular protecting the democratic and constitutional rights of the citizens. However, with the slow, but stable, decline of the public’s belief in the mass media,[2] it is contentious whether the ‘watchdog’ role of the media is still undamaged. The essay will prove that media still remains ‘watchdog’, the ‘fourth estate’ that, more or less, realizes its responsibilities toward society.
Social Responsibility Theory
The Social Responsibility Theory is one among other press theories; some say, there are four theories, the others say that there are really just two theories of the press, Authoritarian and Libertarian, which the latter two theories, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist are merely extensions of.[3] Nevertheless, the Social Responsibility Theory is very important one; it is considered as a theory that should serve to the achievement of valid societal goals. According to this theory, the media have responsibilities toward society; the media should be available to more than a marginal group of people and present more than the opinions of influential politicians. Therefore, the essence of the Social Responsibility Theory is an affirmative role in advocating social justice for general public, which are powerless.
The social responsibility tradition that received its philosophical basis in the American commission of 1947 was actually put into practice with much more determination and effects in countries other than the United States, especially in Western Europe in the two or three decades following the Second World War.[4] The idea was to put order in media’s scene of the Europe; it was a post-war period and Europe needed, more than any thing else, an accountable media that will act responsibly toward demands of society, it will promote a social justice. In a way, for the media, social responsibility should be always a main concern.
The social responsibility model involved a number of ways in which the state could attempt to play a role in attempting to ensure that media fulfills their social obligations whilst at the same time trying, more or less, to retain the independence of the journalism and the freedom of the speech.[5] Mass media should provide citizens with information. They should identify the problems in our society, and unlawful activities of those who have power. Media also should have mobilization function, campaigning for societal purposes in the area of politics and economic development. So, everywhere, social tasks come prior to media rights and freedoms.
The social responsibility model suggests that among others: the media have obligations to society; news media should be truthful, fair, objective and relevant; the media should be free, but self-regulated; the media should follow agreed codes of ethics and professional conducts.[6] According to this, the media in Kosovo and in the region, with a few exceptions, are not respecting the bases of the Social Responsibility Theory. For instance, the daily Bota Sot, deals more with untruthful accusations than with news (i.e. during the national elections before two years daily Bota Sot has written about Mr. Veton Surroi and his ‘marriage’ with the sister of Xhoana Nano-the wife of former Prime Minister, Mr. Fatos Nano).
On the other hand, the Public Television of Kosova (RTK) deals more with unimportant issues than with important ones. People acquire factual information about public affairs from television news, but they also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of emphasis placed on it in the news. If the first story on the newscast is unimportant one, if the length of time dedicated to the salient story is too short, as RTK is doing there is no way to fulfill tasks toward the public. By calling attention to the secondary matters, while ignoring the important ones, RTK is not fulfilling its responsibilities to citizens of Kosova.
According to the Social Responsibility Theory, socially responsible media also should represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to hold government accountable.[7] So, the media should be considered as ‘watchdog’ that the public rely on for revealing errors and wrongdoing by governmental institutions. The Public Television has never revealed even one illegal act, which is done by governmental institutions, and, of course, there are plenty of them. On the other hand, there are some media, socially responsible, that represent the public interest. One of them is daily Koha Ditore; this daily newspaper has revealed a lot of unlawful activities of politicians. A few days ago this newspaper, Koha Ditore has revealed a latest scandal of Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Mr. Astrit Haraqia. The Minister Haraqia has engaged the Italian songstress with Albanian origin to sing for his birthday; every thing has been paid from the money of Kosovo’s tax-payers.
Even in United States, the first constitutional democracy in the world, there are a lot of cases when different forms of media fail to cover issues in a socially responsible manner. For instance, the Nevada Daily Mail, while writing about an investment of Murphy Farms in their city, represented it as a family farm instead of a corporate giant run by Wendell Murphy, an influential former state legislator who is actively involved in gaining agricultural exemptions from state sales taxes; and environmental regulations.[8] Therefore, readers were told not only that family farm had arrived but that the arrival involved potentially controversial issues, such as problems with environment. As a result this investment was not done, since it was not allowed by citizens. By doing this, Nevada Daily Mail didn’t fulfill its tasks to citizens, and later was accused by them for misinformation.[9]
On the other hand, the media’s scene of United States is full of examples where media cover issues in a socially responsible way; it remains a ‘watchdog’ that reveals bad behavior of politicians and in this way fulfills its responsibilities to public. Watergate and the Pentagon Papers were issues of national scope in which a more powerful executive branch of government threw its weight against the media’s ‘watchdog’ legacy; although there have been mixed reviews on the media’s role in these incidents, most authorities writing on that time identify these challenges as the media’s finest exercise of the ‘watchdog’ function.[10]
Current Trends of Media Agenda Setting
Agenda setting is a highly political process: political actors actively seek to bring issues on top of the agenda if they are looking for a change of policy, or to keep them off the agenda if they want to defend the status quo.[11] The function of the media in this process is essential since they determine which issues are the most important ones; agenda setting illustrates a very powerful authority of the media – the capability to inform the public what topics are important.
Two basis assumptions underlie most research on agenda-setting: (1) the press and the media do not reflect reality; they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to perceive those issues as more important than other issues.[12] First of all, media do not represent certainty; there are filters inside of the media, which decide what is ‘real’ and what is ‘false’. In other words, every thing passes through the filters of the media and after that it will be presented to the public; agenda setting is the process that lets some information to reach the audience while other information is kept out. Secondly, different forms of the media tell us which issues are worthy of our attention; or, as Bernard Cohen stated: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”.[13]
The power of the news media to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well–documented influence.[14] Do the media in our country and in the region do such a thing? Of course, there are some media in our country that really set an agenda; however, a lot of them do not set an agenda. Among those media that do not set an agenda is our Public Television (RTK); Public Television of Kosova is characterized by an absence of power to set an agenda, to focus attention on a few important public issues. If most of the stories on the newscast are less important ones, if the length of time dedicated to the main story, if any, is too short, as RTK is performing, there is no chance to set an agenda. Besides, RTK deals more with irrelevant issues; consequently, Public Television remains a surrogate media, which doesn’t fulfill its tasks to public.
United States are known as a country where media set an agenda; this happens always, especially, during the elections. During these political races there is rarely evening news that goes by without having something about the city races, congressional races, and the presidential race.[15] Political debates and presidential news has always flooded the headlines and newscasts during the elections. These issues always are essential and everyone talks about the candidates and their programs. It happens like this since the media leads the public to believe that this is important. As McCombs and Shaw stated, “We judge as important what the media judge as important”.[16]
Conclusion
To conclude, the most important role of the media is that of ‘watchdog’, regular and independent inspection of those in power, including, supply of trustworthy information about their activities. The main concern to the watchdog role is to do the investigative journalism. By doing this, the media consider themselves as a representative of the wide public, and of course, the opponent of government. Media representatives have this right as members of the ‘fourth estate” – their role is to keep an eye on politicians on behalf of the public. This role of the media, the ‘watchdog’ role, is essential if citizens want to hold public officials accountable for their actions. Although, there is a small decline of public’s beliefs in the mass media,[17] they still remain a ‘fourth estate’. Media perform its ‘watchdog’ role and in this way fulfills its tasks toward public; otherwise, the scandals mentioned above and unmentioned ones would always remain unrevealed.
Notes:
[1] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 169.
[2] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
[3] Vincent Campbell, Information Age of Journalism, London, Hodder, 2004, Pg. 32.
[4] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 169.
[5] Vincent Campbell, Information Age of Journalism, London, Hodder, 2004, Pg. 36.
[6] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 172.
[7] Kristie Bunton, “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kristie Bunton, “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
[10] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
[11] Sebastian Princen, Agenda Setting in the European Union, Paper prepared for the NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 11 November 2005.
[12] Paul Weyrich, “TV Network Creates New Link between Citizens, Politicians”, Insight on the News, Vol. 10, N0.4/1994.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Maxwell McCombs, The Agenda Setting Role of the Mass–media in Shaping the Public Opinion (The handbook of Naser Miftari).
[15] Brian Gittinger, “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
[16] Brian Gittinger, “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
[17] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
Bibliography
McQuail, Denis. Mass Communication Theory, London: SAGE Publication, 2005.
Stone, Gerald C. & Mary K. O’Donnell. “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
Campbell, Vincent. Information Age of Journalism, London: Hodder, 2004.
Bunton, Kristie. “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
Princen, Sebastian. Agenda Setting in the European Union, Paper prepared for the NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 11 November 2005.
Gittinger, Brian. “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
McCombs, Maxwell. The Agenda Setting Role of the Mass–media in Shaping the Public Opinion (The handbook given by Naser Miftari).Weyrich, Paul. “TV Network Creates New Link between Citizens, Politicians”, Insight on the News, Vol. 10, N0.4/1994.
By Leonard Ibrahimi
The watchdog conception, according to which, the media is supposed to serve as a controller of government, is one among the oldest main beliefs in journalism. The term ‘fourth estate’, the press’ role in being a ‘watchdog’ that will control the government was reputedly coined by Edmund Burke, in late-eighteenth century in England to refer to the political power possessed by the press of that time, on a same level with the other three ‘estates’ of power in the British realm: Lords, Church and Commons.[1]
This essay will aim to explain the ‘watchdog’ role of the media; in particular it will deal with issues like: Social Responsibility Theory, current trends of media agenda setting, and how media fulfills its role in the society and how it helps opinion make wise and informed decisions. In countries where democracy is fragile, there is less emphasis on the ‘watchdog’ role of the media; circumstances dictate such a thing. On the other hand, in the democratic countries, in the societies with a high level of political culture, the ‘watchdog’ role of the media is highlighted very strongly. Media are considered as a ‘fourth estate’, as a powerful ‘watchdog’, which is used for revealing mistreatments of state authority, in particular protecting the democratic and constitutional rights of the citizens. However, with the slow, but stable, decline of the public’s belief in the mass media,[2] it is contentious whether the ‘watchdog’ role of the media is still undamaged. The essay will prove that media still remains ‘watchdog’, the ‘fourth estate’ that, more or less, realizes its responsibilities toward society.
Social Responsibility Theory
The Social Responsibility Theory is one among other press theories; some say, there are four theories, the others say that there are really just two theories of the press, Authoritarian and Libertarian, which the latter two theories, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist are merely extensions of.[3] Nevertheless, the Social Responsibility Theory is very important one; it is considered as a theory that should serve to the achievement of valid societal goals. According to this theory, the media have responsibilities toward society; the media should be available to more than a marginal group of people and present more than the opinions of influential politicians. Therefore, the essence of the Social Responsibility Theory is an affirmative role in advocating social justice for general public, which are powerless.
The social responsibility tradition that received its philosophical basis in the American commission of 1947 was actually put into practice with much more determination and effects in countries other than the United States, especially in Western Europe in the two or three decades following the Second World War.[4] The idea was to put order in media’s scene of the Europe; it was a post-war period and Europe needed, more than any thing else, an accountable media that will act responsibly toward demands of society, it will promote a social justice. In a way, for the media, social responsibility should be always a main concern.
The social responsibility model involved a number of ways in which the state could attempt to play a role in attempting to ensure that media fulfills their social obligations whilst at the same time trying, more or less, to retain the independence of the journalism and the freedom of the speech.[5] Mass media should provide citizens with information. They should identify the problems in our society, and unlawful activities of those who have power. Media also should have mobilization function, campaigning for societal purposes in the area of politics and economic development. So, everywhere, social tasks come prior to media rights and freedoms.
The social responsibility model suggests that among others: the media have obligations to society; news media should be truthful, fair, objective and relevant; the media should be free, but self-regulated; the media should follow agreed codes of ethics and professional conducts.[6] According to this, the media in Kosovo and in the region, with a few exceptions, are not respecting the bases of the Social Responsibility Theory. For instance, the daily Bota Sot, deals more with untruthful accusations than with news (i.e. during the national elections before two years daily Bota Sot has written about Mr. Veton Surroi and his ‘marriage’ with the sister of Xhoana Nano-the wife of former Prime Minister, Mr. Fatos Nano).
On the other hand, the Public Television of Kosova (RTK) deals more with unimportant issues than with important ones. People acquire factual information about public affairs from television news, but they also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of emphasis placed on it in the news. If the first story on the newscast is unimportant one, if the length of time dedicated to the salient story is too short, as RTK is doing there is no way to fulfill tasks toward the public. By calling attention to the secondary matters, while ignoring the important ones, RTK is not fulfilling its responsibilities to citizens of Kosova.
According to the Social Responsibility Theory, socially responsible media also should represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to hold government accountable.[7] So, the media should be considered as ‘watchdog’ that the public rely on for revealing errors and wrongdoing by governmental institutions. The Public Television has never revealed even one illegal act, which is done by governmental institutions, and, of course, there are plenty of them. On the other hand, there are some media, socially responsible, that represent the public interest. One of them is daily Koha Ditore; this daily newspaper has revealed a lot of unlawful activities of politicians. A few days ago this newspaper, Koha Ditore has revealed a latest scandal of Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Mr. Astrit Haraqia. The Minister Haraqia has engaged the Italian songstress with Albanian origin to sing for his birthday; every thing has been paid from the money of Kosovo’s tax-payers.
Even in United States, the first constitutional democracy in the world, there are a lot of cases when different forms of media fail to cover issues in a socially responsible manner. For instance, the Nevada Daily Mail, while writing about an investment of Murphy Farms in their city, represented it as a family farm instead of a corporate giant run by Wendell Murphy, an influential former state legislator who is actively involved in gaining agricultural exemptions from state sales taxes; and environmental regulations.[8] Therefore, readers were told not only that family farm had arrived but that the arrival involved potentially controversial issues, such as problems with environment. As a result this investment was not done, since it was not allowed by citizens. By doing this, Nevada Daily Mail didn’t fulfill its tasks to citizens, and later was accused by them for misinformation.[9]
On the other hand, the media’s scene of United States is full of examples where media cover issues in a socially responsible way; it remains a ‘watchdog’ that reveals bad behavior of politicians and in this way fulfills its responsibilities to public. Watergate and the Pentagon Papers were issues of national scope in which a more powerful executive branch of government threw its weight against the media’s ‘watchdog’ legacy; although there have been mixed reviews on the media’s role in these incidents, most authorities writing on that time identify these challenges as the media’s finest exercise of the ‘watchdog’ function.[10]
Current Trends of Media Agenda Setting
Agenda setting is a highly political process: political actors actively seek to bring issues on top of the agenda if they are looking for a change of policy, or to keep them off the agenda if they want to defend the status quo.[11] The function of the media in this process is essential since they determine which issues are the most important ones; agenda setting illustrates a very powerful authority of the media – the capability to inform the public what topics are important.
Two basis assumptions underlie most research on agenda-setting: (1) the press and the media do not reflect reality; they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to perceive those issues as more important than other issues.[12] First of all, media do not represent certainty; there are filters inside of the media, which decide what is ‘real’ and what is ‘false’. In other words, every thing passes through the filters of the media and after that it will be presented to the public; agenda setting is the process that lets some information to reach the audience while other information is kept out. Secondly, different forms of the media tell us which issues are worthy of our attention; or, as Bernard Cohen stated: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”.[13]
The power of the news media to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well–documented influence.[14] Do the media in our country and in the region do such a thing? Of course, there are some media in our country that really set an agenda; however, a lot of them do not set an agenda. Among those media that do not set an agenda is our Public Television (RTK); Public Television of Kosova is characterized by an absence of power to set an agenda, to focus attention on a few important public issues. If most of the stories on the newscast are less important ones, if the length of time dedicated to the main story, if any, is too short, as RTK is performing, there is no chance to set an agenda. Besides, RTK deals more with irrelevant issues; consequently, Public Television remains a surrogate media, which doesn’t fulfill its tasks to public.
United States are known as a country where media set an agenda; this happens always, especially, during the elections. During these political races there is rarely evening news that goes by without having something about the city races, congressional races, and the presidential race.[15] Political debates and presidential news has always flooded the headlines and newscasts during the elections. These issues always are essential and everyone talks about the candidates and their programs. It happens like this since the media leads the public to believe that this is important. As McCombs and Shaw stated, “We judge as important what the media judge as important”.[16]
Conclusion
To conclude, the most important role of the media is that of ‘watchdog’, regular and independent inspection of those in power, including, supply of trustworthy information about their activities. The main concern to the watchdog role is to do the investigative journalism. By doing this, the media consider themselves as a representative of the wide public, and of course, the opponent of government. Media representatives have this right as members of the ‘fourth estate” – their role is to keep an eye on politicians on behalf of the public. This role of the media, the ‘watchdog’ role, is essential if citizens want to hold public officials accountable for their actions. Although, there is a small decline of public’s beliefs in the mass media,[17] they still remain a ‘fourth estate’. Media perform its ‘watchdog’ role and in this way fulfills its tasks toward public; otherwise, the scandals mentioned above and unmentioned ones would always remain unrevealed.
Notes:
[1] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 169.
[2] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
[3] Vincent Campbell, Information Age of Journalism, London, Hodder, 2004, Pg. 32.
[4] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 169.
[5] Vincent Campbell, Information Age of Journalism, London, Hodder, 2004, Pg. 36.
[6] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, London, SAGE Publication, 2005, Pg. 172.
[7] Kristie Bunton, “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kristie Bunton, “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
[10] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
[11] Sebastian Princen, Agenda Setting in the European Union, Paper prepared for the NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 11 November 2005.
[12] Paul Weyrich, “TV Network Creates New Link between Citizens, Politicians”, Insight on the News, Vol. 10, N0.4/1994.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Maxwell McCombs, The Agenda Setting Role of the Mass–media in Shaping the Public Opinion (The handbook of Naser Miftari).
[15] Brian Gittinger, “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
[16] Brian Gittinger, “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
[17] Gerald C. Stone & Mary K. O’Donnell, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
Bibliography
McQuail, Denis. Mass Communication Theory, London: SAGE Publication, 2005.
Stone, Gerald C. & Mary K. O’Donnell. “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role”, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 18, N0. 1-2/1997.
Campbell, Vincent. Information Age of Journalism, London: Hodder, 2004.
Bunton, Kristie. “Social Responsibility in Covering Community: a Narrative Case Analyses”, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 13, N0. 4/1998.
Princen, Sebastian. Agenda Setting in the European Union, Paper prepared for the NIG Annual Conference, Nijmegen, 11 November 2005.
Gittinger, Brian. “Agenda Setting Function Examples and Applications”, Insight on the News, Vol. 5/1994.
McCombs, Maxwell. The Agenda Setting Role of the Mass–media in Shaping the Public Opinion (The handbook given by Naser Miftari).Weyrich, Paul. “TV Network Creates New Link between Citizens, Politicians”, Insight on the News, Vol. 10, N0.4/1994.
Tuesday, January 23, 2007
Identiteti Nacional Amerikan
Sfidat dhe Evoluimi
shkruan: Leonard Ibrahimi
Ekziston një pafundësi identitetesh në brendi të një individi; çdo person e ka identitetin e vet familjar, profesional, religjioz, nacional etj. Erik Erikson, një teoricien i mirënjohur, e definoi identitetin si zhvillim të harmonishëm të pikëpamjeve të brendshme personale të një individi dhe pikëpamjeve të tija të influencuara nga të tjerët.[1] Si i tillë, identiteti mund të konsiderohet kategori dinamike dhe gjithnjë e hapur.[2]
Edhe kombet, ashtu sikurse individët, kanë identitet. Identiteti nacional nuk mbështetet vetëm në gjuhën e përbashkët, racën e njëjtë apo pikëpamjet uniforme religjioze. Identiteti nacional është diç më shumë, ai është thellë i rrënjosur në qëllimet dhe idealet e përbashkëta të njerëzve. Këtë më së miri e tregon kombi amerikan në rrugëtimin e tij të gjatë për krijimin e identitetit nacional.
Kolonët e parë filluan të vijnë nga atdheu i tyre, Anglia, para më shumë se dy shekujsh. Identiteti nacional amerikan u zhvillua me kohë dhe është në proces të zhvillimit të mëtejmë. Ky identitet fillon të zë vend në zemrat dhe shpirtrat e burrave dhe grave, të cilët kishin emigruar nga Evropa, për të jetuar në kontinentin e ri.[3] Tradicionalisht, ndjenjat nacionale amerikane nuk kanë qenë etnike, por të bazuara në idenë e jetës së përbashkët dhe në mbrojtjen e idealeve të larta.
Dëshira për t’u njohur si kolektivitet i veçantë, si amerikanë, ishte inkurajuar nga aktet e ndryshme, të natyrës restriktive, të miratuara nga Parlamenti Britanik. Synimi i këtyre akteve ishte ngufatja e sistemit tregtar amerikan. Ishin këto tentativat e fundit të Parlamentit Britanik për të mbajtur nën kontroll kolonitë amerikane. Në këtë mënyrë, identiteti nacional amerikan u formua pa ndonjë orvatje të vetëdijshme; ai ishte reaksion spontan ndaj tendencave britanike për dominim dhe kishte për qëllim mbrojtjen e interesave jetike të qytetarëve të kontinentit të ri. Në këtë mënyrë, përvoja historike se një shoqëri unifikohet vetëm atëherë kur përballet me ‘tjetrin’ e jashtëm,[4] u dëshmua e vërtetë edhe në rastin e identitetit nacional amerikan.
Qytetarët amerikanë ishin disa njerëz nga kombe të ndryshme evropiane, të cilët besuan në idealin se një komb i pavarur dhe unik mund të krijohet, dhe në të, identiteti nacional i lirisë dhe demokracisë do të ishin udhërrëfyes i veprimeve të qytetarëve të kombit të ri.[5] I filluar nga asgjë, identiteti nacional amerikan do ta arrij pjekurinë e tij, mbase ende jo të plotë, pas më shumë se dy shekujsh. Ky identitet, në formën e tij më të re, do të përmbajë: një rritje të përputhshmërive midis këndvështrimeve të brendshme dhe të jashtme, përfshirë këtu edhe të qenit e hapur ndaj kompleksiteteve; rritjen e tolerancës ndaj diversiteteve si dhe pranimin e kufizimeve, me qëllim të fundit, realizimin e një jete më të mirë .[6]
GJENEZA E IDENTITETIT
Gjithçka filloi me vendosjen e trembëdhjetë kolonive në kontinentin e ri. Këto koloni u themeluan për një periudhë të shkurtër kohore, në hapësira të ndryshme gjeografike, në kuadër të kontinentit të ri, me shumësi konfesionesh dhe klasash sociale.[7] Përkundër mungesës së institucioneve të mirëfillta vendore që të ndikojnë në transplantimin e kulturave të caktuara, ardhja e pelegrinëve, rezultoi në transformime të shumta.[8] Të vendosurit jo-anglez e vështirësuan pak a shumë procesin. Kulminacioni arrihet me ardhjen e afrikanëve, në fillim si shërbëtorë e pastaj si skllav, në shoqërinë e cila nuk kishte as traditë e as ligje sa i përket skllavërisë. Sidoqoftë, kultura e brendshme merr formë, përcaktohet, nga gjuha angleze, por me kalimin e kohës do të sfidohet nga gjuhë të tjera, para së gjithash, ajo spanjishte.[9] Në anën tjetër, sistemi politik, i mbështetur në puritanizëm, i cili u përgjigjet në shumë pika teorive më absolute demokratike dhe republikane u formësua nga influenca e madhe që kishin në shoqëri anglezët e ardhur.[10]
Amerika shihej nga kolonët si vend i mundësive të shumta, vend ku ata do t’i shprehnin lirshëm ato që ndjejnë, dhe që sipas tyre ishin të rëndësishme për formën e tyre të të jetuarit.[11] Kolonët filluan ta konsiderojnë Amerikën si faktor që do t’i mbronte vlerat e lirisë dhe do ta luftonte korrupsionin evropian, para së gjithash atë të monarkisë angleze. Deklarata e Pavarësisë dhe vlerat e proklamuara nga Thomas Jefferson-i, jeta, prona dhe liria i formësuan qëllimet e Amerikës dhe të amerikanëve.[12] Më pastaj u konstituuan tri ideale të përgjithshme: liria, barazia dhe vetëqeverisja,[13] ideale këto që do ta shoqërojnë Amerikën dhe identitetin nacional të amerikanëve në rrugëtimin e tyre drejt së ardhmes së ndritshme.
Në anën tjetër, afrikano-amerikanët kërkonin që të Drejtat Natyrore të zbatoheshin për të gjithë, dhe skllavërisë t’i jepej fund.[14] Edhe vetë amerikanët e vunë re një kontradiktë ndërmjet skllavërisë që ata zbatonin ndaj racës së zezë dhe frikës së tyre nga nënshtrimi (skllavërimi) anglez. Do të jetë kjo sfida e parë dhe ndoshta më serioze me të cilën do të përballet identiteti amerikan në rrugëtimin e tij.
REVOLUCIONI: GJENERATOR I IDENTITETIT NACIONAL AMERIKAN
Luftërat kundër Britanisë, e më vonë edhe kundër Francës e forcuan ndjenjën e amerikanëve për t’u identifikuar si komb më vete dhe i veçantë;[15] përderisa amerikanëve u cenohej siguria kombëtare, identiteti nacional kishte prioritet kundruall identiteteve tjera. Porsa, ky faktor të mos ekzistonte, shoqëria përçahej dhe si rrjedhim, identiteti nacional, përkatësisht rëndësia e tij, shënonte rënie. [16]
Pas Revolucionit, themeluesit e kombit të ri, me rënien e rëndësisë së identitetit nacional duhej të ishin të kujdesshëm që të mos i cenojnë identitetet tjera, sidomos atë fetar; ndonëse protestantizmi ishte religjioni që i karakterizonte amerikanët, ata lejuan ushtrimin e konfesioneve të tjera. Karta e të Drejtave të Shteteve garantonte lirinë fetare;[17] baballarët e kombit i kishin kushtuar rëndësi të madhe religjionit, lirisë së ushtrimit të tij. Kujdesi për përcaktimin e sistemit të ri qeverisës, dhe kontrolli i pushteteve për të pamundësuar abuzimin dhe për të parandaluar tiraninë ishte çështje e rëndësisë kapitale për kolonitë; liria dhe demokracia do të jenë bashkudhëtarë me identitetin nacional amerikan, madje pjesë e pandashme e tij.
Përparësitë e liderëve politik, të cilët ishin të edukuar dhe kishin përvojë në këtë sferë të jetës ofronin një garanci se e ardhmja e kolonive do të jetë e sigurt. Kompromisi, pragmatizmi dhe besimi i ndërsjellë ishin fenomene shoqëruese të procesit, që do të shpinte në krijimin e ngadaltë, por të sigurt, të shtetit të ri.[18] Krijimi i këtij shteti, do të ishte e vetmja mënyrë për të konstituuar dhe mbrojtur identitetin nacional,[19] të kombit të ri, identitet ky me karakter më gjithëpërfshirës dhe pan-human.[20]
Përkundër të gjitha këtyre, në këtë fazë të zhvillimit të tij, kombi i ri përballej me sfida të shumta. Ai ishte një entitet, që në vete përfshinte pjesëtarë të racave të ndryshme, të konfesioneve të ndryshme, dhe të origjinave të ndryshme nacionale. Pyetjet më të shpeshta që dëgjoheshin ato ditë ishin: kush është amerikan dhe cilat janë atributet e identitetit amerikan?[21] Kjo mund të kuptohej deri diku, sepse kombi amerikan ishte diçka i veçantë, ishte kombi i parë dhe i vetëm në botë i definuar jo për nga gjaku, por për nga besimet dhe qëndrimet.[22] Amerikanët ishin të mendimit se uniteti i tyre në këto dy kategori, besime dhe qëndrime, pavarësisht origjinës etnike, do të përjashtonte ndryshimet në mes tyre dhe do të ishte katalizator i konstituimit të identitetit të tyre nacional.[23] Për atë kohë dhe kohët që do të vijnë kjo do të mbetet e mahnitshme. Amerika, me të drejt, konsiderohej si sinonim i inkluzivitetit dhe kozmopolitanizmit, kurse amerikanët ishin populli i zgjedhur për këtë mision.
EVOLUIMI I IDENTITETIT NACIONAL AMERIKAN – ETAPAT
Në rrugën e tij drejtë formësimit, identiteti nacional amerikan përshkon disa etapa. Ndër më të rëndësishmet janë:
Etapa e parë - Amerikanët konstituojnë federalizmin si sistem të qeverisjes. Lufta e thellë politike e viteve 1790 – 1800, kishte për qëllim krijimin e identitetit nacional, duke u mësuar për të toleruar dallimet etnike e politike, dhe duke legjitimuar republikanizmin.[24] Kjo më së miri vërehet në deklaratën e Presidentit Thomas Jefferson: “Të gjithë ne jemi republikanë, të gjithë ne jemi federalistë”.[25] Në të njëjtën kohë u instaluan rregulla të reja që do t’ua bënin qytetarëve jetën më të sigurt, më të lehtë dhe më përmbajtjesore. Etërit e kombit vendosën institucione qeverisëse, të atilla, që do të ishin sa më afër qytetarëve, dhe do të punonin për të mirën e tyre; tentohej të krijohej një sistem politik dhe shtetëror me të cilin do të identifikoheshin qytetarët. Bëhej e pamundura që lidershipi politik të mos e humbte ndjeshmërinë ndaj problemeve të qytetarëve. Përvoja e hidhur me Monarkinë Angleze kishte përcaktuar një rrjedhë të këtillë politike. Baballarët e kombit udhëhiqeshin nga ideja se qeverisja e popullit duhet bërë nga populli dhe për popullin.[26]
Etapa e dytë - Emigrimi në kontinentin e ri vazhdon edhe më tutje. Në fillim të shekullit XIX-të, qindra mijëra evropianë morën rrugë për në Amerikë, për në “Tokën e Premtuar”.[27] Amerika i absorboi të gjithë, me sukses të plotë. Ajo që duhet përmendur në këtë fazë, dhe që do të ndikojë në fuqizimin e mëtejmë të identitetit nacional amerikan është se, Kongresi nuk lejoi që të bëhet ndarja e tokave vetëm për pjesëtarë të një nacionaliteti. Kongresi ishte, si gjithnjë, në shërbim të kombit. Ky organ legjislativ asokohe e kishte kuptuar mirë misionin e vet: “Të parandalojë ndarjen e kombit amerikan, para se të bëhej bashkimi i tij”.[28]
Etapa e tretë - Në këtë fazë të evoluimit fillon ardhja e popullatës së zezë.[29] Ata në fillim erdhën si shërbëtorë e më vonë u transformuan në skllevër. Ishte kjo një sfidë e madhe për identitetin amerikan. A do të munden amerikanët ta përfshijnë këtë diversitet, racën e zezë?
Edhe një herë fati kozmopolit, se identiteti amerikan po merr formën e një bashkimi që po ndërtohet nga diversitetet u tregua i saktë.[30] Ndonëse segregacioni ndaj racës së zezë do të vazhdojë për një kohë të gjatë, amerikanët e kuptuan rëndësinë që kishte përfshirja e kësaj race në proceset shoqërore dhe politike të vendit. Kjo do të kërkojë nga ata që të jenë më tolerantë ndaj diversiteteve të ndryshme për hir të idealeve të larta.
Etapa e katërt - Lufta Civile i jep fund eksperimentit, Amerika është e përjetshme – integrimi i të zinjve në shoqëri, si qytetarë, filloi.[31] Amendamenti i XIV-të, paraqet fillimin e fundit të segregacionit. Përfundimisht, të gjithë qytetarët e lindur në Amerikë dhe që kanë marrë shtetësinë e saj, gëzojnë të drejta të barabarta, pavarësisht nga raca.[32] Të kujtojmë se identiteti nacional që po krijohej në këtë kohë ende nuk ishte multi-kulturor, ndonëse kishte përbërje të larmishme.
Etapa e pestë - Në fillim të shekullit të XX-të, përkufizimet e identitetit amerikan vazhdojnë të jenë fluide dhe në zhvillim, thjeshtë të pa-formësuar mirë. Shqetësimi nga valët e reja të emigrimit të njerëzve me bindje radikale dhe besime jo të zakonshme ishte në rritje.[33] Liderët amerikan u bën më agresiv në punët e jashtme, por më mbrojtës të shoqërisë vendore. Kjo periudhë karakterizohej me mbylljen parciale për emigrantët, përveç atyre me bindje dhe qëndrime të njëjta politike. Kjo do të ndikojë në forcimin e identitetit amerikan.
Etapa e gjashtë - Paqartësia dhe frika në lidhje me identitetin nacional u bën evidente në Luftën e Parë Botërore. Megjithatë, dolën në skenë lëvizje të ndryshme që angazhoheshin për përpilimin e programeve të amerikanizimit, programe këto, që do të promovojnë akulturimin e emigrantëve, dhe njëkohësisht integrimin e tyre në shoqërinë kozmopolite amerikane, me bërthamë angleze.[34] Në këtë mënyrë, bëhej e pamundura që emigrantët e porsaardhur të zhvishen nga kultura e tyre nacionale, dhe në ta, të transplantohej kultura amerikane. Pluralizmi kulturor, në këtë kohë konsiderohej si kërcënim për shoqërinë amerikane.
Etapa e shtatë - Lufta e Dytë Botërore është momenti vendimtar për identitetin nacional amerikan. Si përgjigje ndaj nazizmit, Amerika e përqafon multi-kulturalizmin dhe Statuja e Lirisë përfundimisht bëhet simbol i Amerikës, si shtet i emigrantëve.[35] Amerika e kundërshtoi politikën shfarosëse ndaj hebrenjve dhe racave të tjera. Ajo u ofroi strehim të përndjekurve dhe njëkohësisht i integroi ata në shoqërinë amerikane. Emigrantë nga shumë vende të botës, u mblodhën nën flamurin amerikan, për të luftuar kundër një armiku të përbashkët, nazizmit gjerman. Angazhimi i tyre i madh rezultoi me ngushtimin e hendekut midis idealeve të Amerikës dhe realitetit të saj. Kjo ndikoi që modeli i identitetit amerikan të bëhet më gjithëpërfshirës dhe më kompatibil.
Etapa e tetë - Tanimë konsiderohet se identiteti nacional amerikan e ka arritur pjekurinë e tij. Ai bëhet më gjithëpërfshirës. Diversiteti kulturor perceptohet si forcë e jo si kërcënim.[36] Raca akoma mbetet si çështje e diskutueshme. Debati rreth këtij fenomeni ende nuk ka përfunduar. Megjithatë martesat ndër racore bëhen më të shpeshta dhe nuk konsiderohen tabu; si rrjedhim, numri i qytetarëve me racë të përzier rritet.
Fundi i viteve 1980 dhe fillimi i viteve 1990 karakterizohen me zgjerimin e debatit rreth asaj se cili nivel i multi-kulturalizmit do të ishte i mjaftueshëm. A do të mund ta ruajnë amerikanët nukleusin (bërthamën) e tyre të mëparshëm me gjithë ekspansionin e kulturave të ndryshme?[37] Kjo ishte ajo që diskutohej atëkohë. Sidoqoftë, identiteti nacional amerikan i përfaqësonte në mënyrë të denjë parimet themelore të lirisë, të individualizmit, të demokracisë dhe të mundësive të barabarta për të gjithë.[38] Kështu, Amerika mbanë mbi vete një detyrë të shenjtë, të jetë një botë në miniaturë, ku çdo gjë do të jetë ashtu siç duhet.
IDENTITETI AMERIKAN PAS SULMEVE TERRORISTE TЁ 11 SHTATORIT
Sulmet e 11 shtatorit janë padyshim ngjarjet më dramatike në historinë më të re të Amerikës. Për herë të parë pati një manifestim aq të dukshëm të terrorizmit.[39] Tek amerikanët mbisundoi ndjenja e shkatërrimit total. Ata menduan se po e përjetojnë fundin e gjithë asaj që kishin ndërtuar me shekuj të tërë.[40]
Në anën tjetër, përçarja dhe fraksionizmi i shoqërisë, që ishin rezultat i mungesës së përballjes me ‘tjetrin’ e jashtëm, u ndalën. Amerika, papritmas, filloi të përjetoj valën më të madhe të patriotizmit; amerikanët e ri-zbuluan kombin e tyre dhe filluan të identifikohen me të.[41] Të gjithë ishin krenar që ishin amerikan; identiteti nacional ishte shumë i fuqishëm dhe dominonte ndaj identiteteve tjera. Këto sulme terroriste determinuan ndryshime të shumta dhe përcaktuan detyrime të reja të politikës e amerikane. Amerika dhe amerikanët, duhet t’i bindin pjesëtarët e konfesionit islamik në SHBA se janë duke e luftuar terrorizmin e jo religjionin islamik; ‘tjetri’ duhet të mbetet terrorizmi, sepse ndryshe rrezikohet përjashtimi i një pjese të Amerikës.
KONKLUZION
Përfundimi nga gjithë kjo që u tha është i qartë, kombi amerikan është kombi i parë dhe i vetëm në botë që nuk mbështetet në lidhje gjaku, por në besime dhe qëndrime uniforme.[42] Në ditët e para të Revolucionit Amerikan, njerëzit pyetnin: “Kush janë amerikanët?“, “Cili është identiteti që ne po e mbrojmë?“. Sot, dy shekuj më vonë shumëçka është qartësuar. Nëse ka pyetje të tilla, ato janë të arsyeshme, ngase siç u pa, shoqëria amerikane në vete përmban diversitete të ndryshme. Këto diversitete në të kaluarën jo të largët konsideroheshin si kërcënim, kurse tani si forcë.
Identiteti nacional amerikan u krijua; nuk evoluoi në rrugë të natyrshme. Kjo nuk e bën atë të përkryer, por e bën funksional. Funksionaliteti i identitetit amerikan mbështetet në vlerat e tij, të cilat me kalimin e kohës u shtuan dhe u bën më përmbajtjesore e më kompakte. Ato mund të përmblidhen në:· Besimi se Amerika është vend i veçantë, që u ofroi mundësi të barabarta të gjithë atyre që erdhën aty. Në të njëjtën kohë, u ofroi të ardhurve kushte të jashtëzakonshme për ta avancuar veten. Ata që erdhën dje në Amerikë e ndjejnë veten po aq amerikanë sa edhe ata që kanë lindur aty.· Të theksuarit konsekuent të individualizmit. Këtu nuk është me rëndësi se kush janë të ardhurit, por çfarë mund të japin ata.· Pranimi i demokracisë si sistem i qeverisjes; respektimi i të drejtave të minoriteteve; liritë e mishëruara në Kartën e të Drejtave si dhe respektimi i Parimit të Barazisë për të gjithë qytetarët.· Ideja se kombi amerikan mbështetet në republikanizmin dhe idealet e tij. Ky sistem, deri më tani, është treguar shumë i suksesshëm dhe fleksibël ndaj sfidave të ndryshme që para tij i ka sjellë koha.· Pranimi i faktit se Amerika nuk ishte asnjëherë e as që do te jetë ndonjëherë homogjene në aspektin racor, konfesional apo etnik. Identiteti amerikan do të karakterizohet gjithmonë nga multi-kulturalizmi.· Identifikimi me një numër të caktuar të simboleve, përfshirë këtu edhe monumentet kombëtare si, Statuja e Lirisë dhe figurat historike: George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy dhe të tjerë.A do të thotë kjo se përkundër rritjes dhe ekspansionit të identitetit amerikan, ai vazhdon të evoluojë, duke përfshirë edhe më shumë vlera në vitet që do të vijnë? Një gjë është e qartë: përderisa Amerika të jetë vend i emigrantëve dhe indigjenëve; i racave të shumta; i besimeve dhe bindjeve të ndryshme, identiteti nacional amerikan do të vazhdojë të evoluojë konform kërkesave që i parashtron koha. Fundja, identiteti konsiderohet si kategori dinamike dhe gjithnjë e hapur.[43]
NOTES:[1] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[2] Isuf Berisha. Identiteti dhe Konfrontimi: Shqiptarët dhe Serbët, Nga Reader-i[3] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[4] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We. London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 18.[5] Morton A. Kaplan,.“September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[6] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 22-23.[7] Aleksi de Tokëvil. Demokracia në Amerikë. Tiranë: Kristalina-KH, 2002. Fq. 19-21.[8] Emigrantët e quanin veten Pelegrinë. Shih: Aleksi de Tokëvil. Demokracia në Amerikë. Tiranë: Kristalina-KH, 2002.[9] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 18-19.[10] Karen O’ Connor, Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 33-45.[11] Ibid. Fq. 21-22[12] Ibid. Fq. 50-52.[13] Morton A. Kaplan, “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[14] Zyra e programeve ndërkombëtare të informacionit, DEPARTAMENTI I SHTETIT I SHTETEVE TË BASHKUARA TË AMERIKES. Vështrim mbi Sistemin Amerikan të Qeverisjes. Fq. 26-28.[15] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 17-20.[16] Ibid. Fq. 15-17.[17] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change, Alternate 2004 Edition. PEARSON Longman. New York. Fq. 52-54.[18] John Fonte & Joseph E. Fallon. “We the Peoples: The Multiculturalist Agenda is Shattering the American Identity”. National Review. Vol. 48. March 25, 1996.[19] Michael Ignatieff. Gjaku dhe Përkatësia, Udhëtime në Nacionalizmin e Ri. Tiranë: DITURIA, 2000. Fq. 169-171.[20] Erik Erikson e konsideronte të tillë identitetin nacional amerikan.[21] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 61-63.[22] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[23] John Fonte & Joseph E. Fallon. “We the Peoples: The Multiculturalist Agenda is Shattering the American Identity”. National Review. Vol. 48. March 25, 1996.[24] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 44.[25] Ibid. Fq. 80.[26] Ibid. Fq. 61-63.[27] Ibid. Fq. 23.[28] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[29] Ibid.[30] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 17.[31] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 71.[32] Zyra e programeve ndërkombëtare të informacionit, DEPARTAMENTI I SHTETIT I SHTETEVE TË BASHKUARA TË AMERIKES. Vështrim mbi Sistemin Amerikan të Qeverisjes. Fq. 27.[33] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 80.[34] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 23.[35] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 85.[36] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[37] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 221.[38] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 89.[39] Ibid. Fq. 154.[40] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 269-271.[41] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 3-7.[42] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[43] Isuf Berisha, Identiteti dhe Konfrontimi: Shqiptarët dhe Serbët, Nga Reader-i
BIBLIOGRAFIA
Aleksi de Tokëvil. Demokracia në Amerikë, Tiranë 2002.Karen O’ Connor, Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004.Michael Ignatieff. Gjaku dhe Përkatësia, Udhëtime në Nacionalizmin e Ri. Tiranë: DITURIA, 2000.Zyra e programeve ndërkombëtare të informacionit, DEPARTAMENTI I SHTETIT I SHTETEVE TË BASHKUARA TË AMERIKES. Vështrim mbi Sistemin Amerikan të Qeverisjes, 2002.Isuf Berisha. Identiteti dhe Konfrontimi: Shqiptarët dhe Serbët, Nga Reader-i.Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004.John Fonte & Joseph E. Fallon. “We the Peoples: The Multiculturalist Agenda is Shattering the American Identity”. National Review. Vol. 48. March 25, 1996.Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006.
shkruan: Leonard Ibrahimi
Ekziston një pafundësi identitetesh në brendi të një individi; çdo person e ka identitetin e vet familjar, profesional, religjioz, nacional etj. Erik Erikson, një teoricien i mirënjohur, e definoi identitetin si zhvillim të harmonishëm të pikëpamjeve të brendshme personale të një individi dhe pikëpamjeve të tija të influencuara nga të tjerët.[1] Si i tillë, identiteti mund të konsiderohet kategori dinamike dhe gjithnjë e hapur.[2]
Edhe kombet, ashtu sikurse individët, kanë identitet. Identiteti nacional nuk mbështetet vetëm në gjuhën e përbashkët, racën e njëjtë apo pikëpamjet uniforme religjioze. Identiteti nacional është diç më shumë, ai është thellë i rrënjosur në qëllimet dhe idealet e përbashkëta të njerëzve. Këtë më së miri e tregon kombi amerikan në rrugëtimin e tij të gjatë për krijimin e identitetit nacional.
Kolonët e parë filluan të vijnë nga atdheu i tyre, Anglia, para më shumë se dy shekujsh. Identiteti nacional amerikan u zhvillua me kohë dhe është në proces të zhvillimit të mëtejmë. Ky identitet fillon të zë vend në zemrat dhe shpirtrat e burrave dhe grave, të cilët kishin emigruar nga Evropa, për të jetuar në kontinentin e ri.[3] Tradicionalisht, ndjenjat nacionale amerikane nuk kanë qenë etnike, por të bazuara në idenë e jetës së përbashkët dhe në mbrojtjen e idealeve të larta.
Dëshira për t’u njohur si kolektivitet i veçantë, si amerikanë, ishte inkurajuar nga aktet e ndryshme, të natyrës restriktive, të miratuara nga Parlamenti Britanik. Synimi i këtyre akteve ishte ngufatja e sistemit tregtar amerikan. Ishin këto tentativat e fundit të Parlamentit Britanik për të mbajtur nën kontroll kolonitë amerikane. Në këtë mënyrë, identiteti nacional amerikan u formua pa ndonjë orvatje të vetëdijshme; ai ishte reaksion spontan ndaj tendencave britanike për dominim dhe kishte për qëllim mbrojtjen e interesave jetike të qytetarëve të kontinentit të ri. Në këtë mënyrë, përvoja historike se një shoqëri unifikohet vetëm atëherë kur përballet me ‘tjetrin’ e jashtëm,[4] u dëshmua e vërtetë edhe në rastin e identitetit nacional amerikan.
Qytetarët amerikanë ishin disa njerëz nga kombe të ndryshme evropiane, të cilët besuan në idealin se një komb i pavarur dhe unik mund të krijohet, dhe në të, identiteti nacional i lirisë dhe demokracisë do të ishin udhërrëfyes i veprimeve të qytetarëve të kombit të ri.[5] I filluar nga asgjë, identiteti nacional amerikan do ta arrij pjekurinë e tij, mbase ende jo të plotë, pas më shumë se dy shekujsh. Ky identitet, në formën e tij më të re, do të përmbajë: një rritje të përputhshmërive midis këndvështrimeve të brendshme dhe të jashtme, përfshirë këtu edhe të qenit e hapur ndaj kompleksiteteve; rritjen e tolerancës ndaj diversiteteve si dhe pranimin e kufizimeve, me qëllim të fundit, realizimin e një jete më të mirë .[6]
GJENEZA E IDENTITETIT
Gjithçka filloi me vendosjen e trembëdhjetë kolonive në kontinentin e ri. Këto koloni u themeluan për një periudhë të shkurtër kohore, në hapësira të ndryshme gjeografike, në kuadër të kontinentit të ri, me shumësi konfesionesh dhe klasash sociale.[7] Përkundër mungesës së institucioneve të mirëfillta vendore që të ndikojnë në transplantimin e kulturave të caktuara, ardhja e pelegrinëve, rezultoi në transformime të shumta.[8] Të vendosurit jo-anglez e vështirësuan pak a shumë procesin. Kulminacioni arrihet me ardhjen e afrikanëve, në fillim si shërbëtorë e pastaj si skllav, në shoqërinë e cila nuk kishte as traditë e as ligje sa i përket skllavërisë. Sidoqoftë, kultura e brendshme merr formë, përcaktohet, nga gjuha angleze, por me kalimin e kohës do të sfidohet nga gjuhë të tjera, para së gjithash, ajo spanjishte.[9] Në anën tjetër, sistemi politik, i mbështetur në puritanizëm, i cili u përgjigjet në shumë pika teorive më absolute demokratike dhe republikane u formësua nga influenca e madhe që kishin në shoqëri anglezët e ardhur.[10]
Amerika shihej nga kolonët si vend i mundësive të shumta, vend ku ata do t’i shprehnin lirshëm ato që ndjejnë, dhe që sipas tyre ishin të rëndësishme për formën e tyre të të jetuarit.[11] Kolonët filluan ta konsiderojnë Amerikën si faktor që do t’i mbronte vlerat e lirisë dhe do ta luftonte korrupsionin evropian, para së gjithash atë të monarkisë angleze. Deklarata e Pavarësisë dhe vlerat e proklamuara nga Thomas Jefferson-i, jeta, prona dhe liria i formësuan qëllimet e Amerikës dhe të amerikanëve.[12] Më pastaj u konstituuan tri ideale të përgjithshme: liria, barazia dhe vetëqeverisja,[13] ideale këto që do ta shoqërojnë Amerikën dhe identitetin nacional të amerikanëve në rrugëtimin e tyre drejt së ardhmes së ndritshme.
Në anën tjetër, afrikano-amerikanët kërkonin që të Drejtat Natyrore të zbatoheshin për të gjithë, dhe skllavërisë t’i jepej fund.[14] Edhe vetë amerikanët e vunë re një kontradiktë ndërmjet skllavërisë që ata zbatonin ndaj racës së zezë dhe frikës së tyre nga nënshtrimi (skllavërimi) anglez. Do të jetë kjo sfida e parë dhe ndoshta më serioze me të cilën do të përballet identiteti amerikan në rrugëtimin e tij.
REVOLUCIONI: GJENERATOR I IDENTITETIT NACIONAL AMERIKAN
Luftërat kundër Britanisë, e më vonë edhe kundër Francës e forcuan ndjenjën e amerikanëve për t’u identifikuar si komb më vete dhe i veçantë;[15] përderisa amerikanëve u cenohej siguria kombëtare, identiteti nacional kishte prioritet kundruall identiteteve tjera. Porsa, ky faktor të mos ekzistonte, shoqëria përçahej dhe si rrjedhim, identiteti nacional, përkatësisht rëndësia e tij, shënonte rënie. [16]
Pas Revolucionit, themeluesit e kombit të ri, me rënien e rëndësisë së identitetit nacional duhej të ishin të kujdesshëm që të mos i cenojnë identitetet tjera, sidomos atë fetar; ndonëse protestantizmi ishte religjioni që i karakterizonte amerikanët, ata lejuan ushtrimin e konfesioneve të tjera. Karta e të Drejtave të Shteteve garantonte lirinë fetare;[17] baballarët e kombit i kishin kushtuar rëndësi të madhe religjionit, lirisë së ushtrimit të tij. Kujdesi për përcaktimin e sistemit të ri qeverisës, dhe kontrolli i pushteteve për të pamundësuar abuzimin dhe për të parandaluar tiraninë ishte çështje e rëndësisë kapitale për kolonitë; liria dhe demokracia do të jenë bashkudhëtarë me identitetin nacional amerikan, madje pjesë e pandashme e tij.
Përparësitë e liderëve politik, të cilët ishin të edukuar dhe kishin përvojë në këtë sferë të jetës ofronin një garanci se e ardhmja e kolonive do të jetë e sigurt. Kompromisi, pragmatizmi dhe besimi i ndërsjellë ishin fenomene shoqëruese të procesit, që do të shpinte në krijimin e ngadaltë, por të sigurt, të shtetit të ri.[18] Krijimi i këtij shteti, do të ishte e vetmja mënyrë për të konstituuar dhe mbrojtur identitetin nacional,[19] të kombit të ri, identitet ky me karakter më gjithëpërfshirës dhe pan-human.[20]
Përkundër të gjitha këtyre, në këtë fazë të zhvillimit të tij, kombi i ri përballej me sfida të shumta. Ai ishte një entitet, që në vete përfshinte pjesëtarë të racave të ndryshme, të konfesioneve të ndryshme, dhe të origjinave të ndryshme nacionale. Pyetjet më të shpeshta që dëgjoheshin ato ditë ishin: kush është amerikan dhe cilat janë atributet e identitetit amerikan?[21] Kjo mund të kuptohej deri diku, sepse kombi amerikan ishte diçka i veçantë, ishte kombi i parë dhe i vetëm në botë i definuar jo për nga gjaku, por për nga besimet dhe qëndrimet.[22] Amerikanët ishin të mendimit se uniteti i tyre në këto dy kategori, besime dhe qëndrime, pavarësisht origjinës etnike, do të përjashtonte ndryshimet në mes tyre dhe do të ishte katalizator i konstituimit të identitetit të tyre nacional.[23] Për atë kohë dhe kohët që do të vijnë kjo do të mbetet e mahnitshme. Amerika, me të drejt, konsiderohej si sinonim i inkluzivitetit dhe kozmopolitanizmit, kurse amerikanët ishin populli i zgjedhur për këtë mision.
EVOLUIMI I IDENTITETIT NACIONAL AMERIKAN – ETAPAT
Në rrugën e tij drejtë formësimit, identiteti nacional amerikan përshkon disa etapa. Ndër më të rëndësishmet janë:
Etapa e parë - Amerikanët konstituojnë federalizmin si sistem të qeverisjes. Lufta e thellë politike e viteve 1790 – 1800, kishte për qëllim krijimin e identitetit nacional, duke u mësuar për të toleruar dallimet etnike e politike, dhe duke legjitimuar republikanizmin.[24] Kjo më së miri vërehet në deklaratën e Presidentit Thomas Jefferson: “Të gjithë ne jemi republikanë, të gjithë ne jemi federalistë”.[25] Në të njëjtën kohë u instaluan rregulla të reja që do t’ua bënin qytetarëve jetën më të sigurt, më të lehtë dhe më përmbajtjesore. Etërit e kombit vendosën institucione qeverisëse, të atilla, që do të ishin sa më afër qytetarëve, dhe do të punonin për të mirën e tyre; tentohej të krijohej një sistem politik dhe shtetëror me të cilin do të identifikoheshin qytetarët. Bëhej e pamundura që lidershipi politik të mos e humbte ndjeshmërinë ndaj problemeve të qytetarëve. Përvoja e hidhur me Monarkinë Angleze kishte përcaktuar një rrjedhë të këtillë politike. Baballarët e kombit udhëhiqeshin nga ideja se qeverisja e popullit duhet bërë nga populli dhe për popullin.[26]
Etapa e dytë - Emigrimi në kontinentin e ri vazhdon edhe më tutje. Në fillim të shekullit XIX-të, qindra mijëra evropianë morën rrugë për në Amerikë, për në “Tokën e Premtuar”.[27] Amerika i absorboi të gjithë, me sukses të plotë. Ajo që duhet përmendur në këtë fazë, dhe që do të ndikojë në fuqizimin e mëtejmë të identitetit nacional amerikan është se, Kongresi nuk lejoi që të bëhet ndarja e tokave vetëm për pjesëtarë të një nacionaliteti. Kongresi ishte, si gjithnjë, në shërbim të kombit. Ky organ legjislativ asokohe e kishte kuptuar mirë misionin e vet: “Të parandalojë ndarjen e kombit amerikan, para se të bëhej bashkimi i tij”.[28]
Etapa e tretë - Në këtë fazë të evoluimit fillon ardhja e popullatës së zezë.[29] Ata në fillim erdhën si shërbëtorë e më vonë u transformuan në skllevër. Ishte kjo një sfidë e madhe për identitetin amerikan. A do të munden amerikanët ta përfshijnë këtë diversitet, racën e zezë?
Edhe një herë fati kozmopolit, se identiteti amerikan po merr formën e një bashkimi që po ndërtohet nga diversitetet u tregua i saktë.[30] Ndonëse segregacioni ndaj racës së zezë do të vazhdojë për një kohë të gjatë, amerikanët e kuptuan rëndësinë që kishte përfshirja e kësaj race në proceset shoqërore dhe politike të vendit. Kjo do të kërkojë nga ata që të jenë më tolerantë ndaj diversiteteve të ndryshme për hir të idealeve të larta.
Etapa e katërt - Lufta Civile i jep fund eksperimentit, Amerika është e përjetshme – integrimi i të zinjve në shoqëri, si qytetarë, filloi.[31] Amendamenti i XIV-të, paraqet fillimin e fundit të segregacionit. Përfundimisht, të gjithë qytetarët e lindur në Amerikë dhe që kanë marrë shtetësinë e saj, gëzojnë të drejta të barabarta, pavarësisht nga raca.[32] Të kujtojmë se identiteti nacional që po krijohej në këtë kohë ende nuk ishte multi-kulturor, ndonëse kishte përbërje të larmishme.
Etapa e pestë - Në fillim të shekullit të XX-të, përkufizimet e identitetit amerikan vazhdojnë të jenë fluide dhe në zhvillim, thjeshtë të pa-formësuar mirë. Shqetësimi nga valët e reja të emigrimit të njerëzve me bindje radikale dhe besime jo të zakonshme ishte në rritje.[33] Liderët amerikan u bën më agresiv në punët e jashtme, por më mbrojtës të shoqërisë vendore. Kjo periudhë karakterizohej me mbylljen parciale për emigrantët, përveç atyre me bindje dhe qëndrime të njëjta politike. Kjo do të ndikojë në forcimin e identitetit amerikan.
Etapa e gjashtë - Paqartësia dhe frika në lidhje me identitetin nacional u bën evidente në Luftën e Parë Botërore. Megjithatë, dolën në skenë lëvizje të ndryshme që angazhoheshin për përpilimin e programeve të amerikanizimit, programe këto, që do të promovojnë akulturimin e emigrantëve, dhe njëkohësisht integrimin e tyre në shoqërinë kozmopolite amerikane, me bërthamë angleze.[34] Në këtë mënyrë, bëhej e pamundura që emigrantët e porsaardhur të zhvishen nga kultura e tyre nacionale, dhe në ta, të transplantohej kultura amerikane. Pluralizmi kulturor, në këtë kohë konsiderohej si kërcënim për shoqërinë amerikane.
Etapa e shtatë - Lufta e Dytë Botërore është momenti vendimtar për identitetin nacional amerikan. Si përgjigje ndaj nazizmit, Amerika e përqafon multi-kulturalizmin dhe Statuja e Lirisë përfundimisht bëhet simbol i Amerikës, si shtet i emigrantëve.[35] Amerika e kundërshtoi politikën shfarosëse ndaj hebrenjve dhe racave të tjera. Ajo u ofroi strehim të përndjekurve dhe njëkohësisht i integroi ata në shoqërinë amerikane. Emigrantë nga shumë vende të botës, u mblodhën nën flamurin amerikan, për të luftuar kundër një armiku të përbashkët, nazizmit gjerman. Angazhimi i tyre i madh rezultoi me ngushtimin e hendekut midis idealeve të Amerikës dhe realitetit të saj. Kjo ndikoi që modeli i identitetit amerikan të bëhet më gjithëpërfshirës dhe më kompatibil.
Etapa e tetë - Tanimë konsiderohet se identiteti nacional amerikan e ka arritur pjekurinë e tij. Ai bëhet më gjithëpërfshirës. Diversiteti kulturor perceptohet si forcë e jo si kërcënim.[36] Raca akoma mbetet si çështje e diskutueshme. Debati rreth këtij fenomeni ende nuk ka përfunduar. Megjithatë martesat ndër racore bëhen më të shpeshta dhe nuk konsiderohen tabu; si rrjedhim, numri i qytetarëve me racë të përzier rritet.
Fundi i viteve 1980 dhe fillimi i viteve 1990 karakterizohen me zgjerimin e debatit rreth asaj se cili nivel i multi-kulturalizmit do të ishte i mjaftueshëm. A do të mund ta ruajnë amerikanët nukleusin (bërthamën) e tyre të mëparshëm me gjithë ekspansionin e kulturave të ndryshme?[37] Kjo ishte ajo që diskutohej atëkohë. Sidoqoftë, identiteti nacional amerikan i përfaqësonte në mënyrë të denjë parimet themelore të lirisë, të individualizmit, të demokracisë dhe të mundësive të barabarta për të gjithë.[38] Kështu, Amerika mbanë mbi vete një detyrë të shenjtë, të jetë një botë në miniaturë, ku çdo gjë do të jetë ashtu siç duhet.
IDENTITETI AMERIKAN PAS SULMEVE TERRORISTE TЁ 11 SHTATORIT
Sulmet e 11 shtatorit janë padyshim ngjarjet më dramatike në historinë më të re të Amerikës. Për herë të parë pati një manifestim aq të dukshëm të terrorizmit.[39] Tek amerikanët mbisundoi ndjenja e shkatërrimit total. Ata menduan se po e përjetojnë fundin e gjithë asaj që kishin ndërtuar me shekuj të tërë.[40]
Në anën tjetër, përçarja dhe fraksionizmi i shoqërisë, që ishin rezultat i mungesës së përballjes me ‘tjetrin’ e jashtëm, u ndalën. Amerika, papritmas, filloi të përjetoj valën më të madhe të patriotizmit; amerikanët e ri-zbuluan kombin e tyre dhe filluan të identifikohen me të.[41] Të gjithë ishin krenar që ishin amerikan; identiteti nacional ishte shumë i fuqishëm dhe dominonte ndaj identiteteve tjera. Këto sulme terroriste determinuan ndryshime të shumta dhe përcaktuan detyrime të reja të politikës e amerikane. Amerika dhe amerikanët, duhet t’i bindin pjesëtarët e konfesionit islamik në SHBA se janë duke e luftuar terrorizmin e jo religjionin islamik; ‘tjetri’ duhet të mbetet terrorizmi, sepse ndryshe rrezikohet përjashtimi i një pjese të Amerikës.
KONKLUZION
Përfundimi nga gjithë kjo që u tha është i qartë, kombi amerikan është kombi i parë dhe i vetëm në botë që nuk mbështetet në lidhje gjaku, por në besime dhe qëndrime uniforme.[42] Në ditët e para të Revolucionit Amerikan, njerëzit pyetnin: “Kush janë amerikanët?“, “Cili është identiteti që ne po e mbrojmë?“. Sot, dy shekuj më vonë shumëçka është qartësuar. Nëse ka pyetje të tilla, ato janë të arsyeshme, ngase siç u pa, shoqëria amerikane në vete përmban diversitete të ndryshme. Këto diversitete në të kaluarën jo të largët konsideroheshin si kërcënim, kurse tani si forcë.
Identiteti nacional amerikan u krijua; nuk evoluoi në rrugë të natyrshme. Kjo nuk e bën atë të përkryer, por e bën funksional. Funksionaliteti i identitetit amerikan mbështetet në vlerat e tij, të cilat me kalimin e kohës u shtuan dhe u bën më përmbajtjesore e më kompakte. Ato mund të përmblidhen në:· Besimi se Amerika është vend i veçantë, që u ofroi mundësi të barabarta të gjithë atyre që erdhën aty. Në të njëjtën kohë, u ofroi të ardhurve kushte të jashtëzakonshme për ta avancuar veten. Ata që erdhën dje në Amerikë e ndjejnë veten po aq amerikanë sa edhe ata që kanë lindur aty.· Të theksuarit konsekuent të individualizmit. Këtu nuk është me rëndësi se kush janë të ardhurit, por çfarë mund të japin ata.· Pranimi i demokracisë si sistem i qeverisjes; respektimi i të drejtave të minoriteteve; liritë e mishëruara në Kartën e të Drejtave si dhe respektimi i Parimit të Barazisë për të gjithë qytetarët.· Ideja se kombi amerikan mbështetet në republikanizmin dhe idealet e tij. Ky sistem, deri më tani, është treguar shumë i suksesshëm dhe fleksibël ndaj sfidave të ndryshme që para tij i ka sjellë koha.· Pranimi i faktit se Amerika nuk ishte asnjëherë e as që do te jetë ndonjëherë homogjene në aspektin racor, konfesional apo etnik. Identiteti amerikan do të karakterizohet gjithmonë nga multi-kulturalizmi.· Identifikimi me një numër të caktuar të simboleve, përfshirë këtu edhe monumentet kombëtare si, Statuja e Lirisë dhe figurat historike: George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy dhe të tjerë.A do të thotë kjo se përkundër rritjes dhe ekspansionit të identitetit amerikan, ai vazhdon të evoluojë, duke përfshirë edhe më shumë vlera në vitet që do të vijnë? Një gjë është e qartë: përderisa Amerika të jetë vend i emigrantëve dhe indigjenëve; i racave të shumta; i besimeve dhe bindjeve të ndryshme, identiteti nacional amerikan do të vazhdojë të evoluojë konform kërkesave që i parashtron koha. Fundja, identiteti konsiderohet si kategori dinamike dhe gjithnjë e hapur.[43]
NOTES:[1] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[2] Isuf Berisha. Identiteti dhe Konfrontimi: Shqiptarët dhe Serbët, Nga Reader-i[3] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[4] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We. London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 18.[5] Morton A. Kaplan,.“September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[6] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 22-23.[7] Aleksi de Tokëvil. Demokracia në Amerikë. Tiranë: Kristalina-KH, 2002. Fq. 19-21.[8] Emigrantët e quanin veten Pelegrinë. Shih: Aleksi de Tokëvil. Demokracia në Amerikë. Tiranë: Kristalina-KH, 2002.[9] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 18-19.[10] Karen O’ Connor, Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 33-45.[11] Ibid. Fq. 21-22[12] Ibid. Fq. 50-52.[13] Morton A. Kaplan, “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[14] Zyra e programeve ndërkombëtare të informacionit, DEPARTAMENTI I SHTETIT I SHTETEVE TË BASHKUARA TË AMERIKES. Vështrim mbi Sistemin Amerikan të Qeverisjes. Fq. 26-28.[15] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 17-20.[16] Ibid. Fq. 15-17.[17] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change, Alternate 2004 Edition. PEARSON Longman. New York. Fq. 52-54.[18] John Fonte & Joseph E. Fallon. “We the Peoples: The Multiculturalist Agenda is Shattering the American Identity”. National Review. Vol. 48. March 25, 1996.[19] Michael Ignatieff. Gjaku dhe Përkatësia, Udhëtime në Nacionalizmin e Ri. Tiranë: DITURIA, 2000. Fq. 169-171.[20] Erik Erikson e konsideronte të tillë identitetin nacional amerikan.[21] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 61-63.[22] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[23] John Fonte & Joseph E. Fallon. “We the Peoples: The Multiculturalist Agenda is Shattering the American Identity”. National Review. Vol. 48. March 25, 1996.[24] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 44.[25] Ibid. Fq. 80.[26] Ibid. Fq. 61-63.[27] Ibid. Fq. 23.[28] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[29] Ibid.[30] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 17.[31] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 71.[32] Zyra e programeve ndërkombëtare të informacionit, DEPARTAMENTI I SHTETIT I SHTETEVE TË BASHKUARA TË AMERIKES. Vështrim mbi Sistemin Amerikan të Qeverisjes. Fq. 27.[33] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 80.[34] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 23.[35] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 85.[36] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[37] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 221.[38] Karen O’ Connor & Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004. Fq. 89.[39] Ibid. Fq. 154.[40] Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006. Fq. 269-271.[41] Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Fq. 3-7.[42] Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.[43] Isuf Berisha, Identiteti dhe Konfrontimi: Shqiptarët dhe Serbët, Nga Reader-i
BIBLIOGRAFIA
Aleksi de Tokëvil. Demokracia në Amerikë, Tiranë 2002.Karen O’ Connor, Larry J. Sabato. American Government, Continuity and Change. New York: PEARSON Longman, 2004.Michael Ignatieff. Gjaku dhe Përkatësia, Udhëtime në Nacionalizmin e Ri. Tiranë: DITURIA, 2000.Zyra e programeve ndërkombëtare të informacionit, DEPARTAMENTI I SHTETIT I SHTETEVE TË BASHKUARA TË AMERIKES. Vështrim mbi Sistemin Amerikan të Qeverisjes, 2002.Isuf Berisha. Identiteti dhe Konfrontimi: Shqiptarët dhe Serbët, Nga Reader-i.Morton A. Kaplan. “September 11, 2001”, World and I, Vol. 16, November 2001.Samuel P. Huntington. Who are We? London: Simon & Schuster, 2004.John Fonte & Joseph E. Fallon. “We the Peoples: The Multiculturalist Agenda is Shattering the American Identity”. National Review. Vol. 48. March 25, 1996.Zenun Halili. Politika dhe Qeverisja e Shteteve të Bashkuara të Amerikës. Prishtinë: Adea, 2006.
Saturday, January 20, 2007
New York Times and Tiananmen Square
The Crackdown in Tiananmen Square
By Leonard Ibrahimi
In 1989 the New York Times, like many other newspapers, reported the Tiananmen Square’s events in Beijing. On June 4th, 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged military force to suppress a student-led demonstration that had been gathering strength in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square since April 15th, 1989. The crackdown on the Tiananmen Square Movement was reported and interpreted in different ways by different media.
The New York Times, a very influential newspaper on policy makers, covered this incident with its correspondents; one among them was Nicholas Kristof. “He had graduated from Harvard College in three years, was Phi Beta Kappa in 1981, and then won first class honors in his study of law at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship. He later studied Arabic in Cairo and Chinese in Taipei”.[1]Kristof has lived in four continents, reported on six, and traveled to well over 100 countries. “He joined The New York Times in October 1984, in the beginning covering economy issues. After that, he served as a business correspondent based in Los Angeles, Hong Kong bureau chief, and Beijing bureau chief”.[2]The journalistic reports from Tiananmen Square, with a few exceptions, were all tied together by a common thread of inconsistency, presenting conflicting accounts of the military crackdown in two main areas: the number of casualties and whether the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) killed students inside the square, as opposed to only those blocking the army’s corridor on the main roads leading to the square.This case examines the journalistic responsibilities of information gathering and their verification. “Most of the hundreds of foreign journalists that night were in other parts of the city or were removed from the square”.[3] Consequently, they could not witness the final chapter of the student story.Those who tried to remain close filed dramatic accounts that, in some cases, supported the myth of a student massacre; “some newspapers that had become sympathetic to the movement, reported 4,000 deaths”.[4] Moreover, even the New York Times picked up some ‘eyewitness’ stories about mass killing of students inside the Tiananmen Square by hundreds of machine guns.This case, in particular, explores whether the New York Times reporter, Nicholas Kristof, took the right step to acquire the most accurate information by challenging, in this way, even its own editors.
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) introduced some capitalist market reforms after Mao Zedong's death, when the groupings around Deng Xiaoping took over party leadership. “These reforms, which allowed many of those who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution to return to privileged positions, have had encouraged ‘pragmatism’ – meaning learn from the capitalist countries”.[5]By early 1989, these economic reforms had led some groups of people to become dissatisfied with the government. These groups, especially students and intellectuals, believed that the reforms had not gone far enough and that China needed, more than anything else, to reform its political system. Moreover, since the economic reforms had only affected farmers and factory workers, “the incomes of intellectuals lagged far behind those who had benefited from reform policies”.[6]
IN THE SQUARE AND AROUND IT
It was early summer in Beijing, the capital city of China; tens of thousands of ordinary citizens led by students and intellectuals squatted on vacant public area called Tiananmen Square. “After this occurrence the square was named: The Avenue of Eternal Peace”.[7] Protesters demanded a consultation with their government and the passage of certain legislation. “To the heads of government and the local press, they were agitators with a political agenda that threatened to disrupt and endanger the nation”.[8]
After protesters’ demands were rejected, people did not leave their encampments. The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, refusing to meet with them, called on the national army to disperse the crowds. “As far as is known, the first violence came at around 10:30 P.M. on June 3 at Gongzhufen, where vanguard contingents of the assault force used about twenty armored personnel carriers to crash through bus barricades that were blocking the circular intersection”.[9] Soldiers charged the crowds with bayonets, tanks and tear gas and leveled the tents; “fires burned the camps to the ground”.[10]
Reports of the occurrences in Tiananmen Square were spreading and being published in Asian newspapers before Kristof sent a report about the events. “According to a widely reprinted 'eyewitness' account, which first ran in a Hong Kong paper and was purportedly written by a student, a huge number of students – hundreds of them, had been killed during the first hours of the massacre”.[11] This story was picked up by many newspapers, among others, The New York Times, although reporter Nicholas Kristof very quickly challenged this particular version.
Tiananmen Square is the largest public space in the world. “It extends over 100 acres, and no single eyewitness could hope to encompass the complex and confusing sequence of events that unfolded there on the night of June 3-4”.[12] Therefore, an objective report of what was happening had to be supplemented by the testimony of others who saw what happened at crucial moments.
In this context, Kristof tried to get as much information as possible about the event from the scene (square). “I was in my Beijing apartment when I heard that troops had opened fire and were trying to force their way to Tiananmen”,[13] he said. “So, I raced to the scene on my bicycle, dodging tank traps that protesters had erected”.[14]
Anxiety and vagueness were everywhere; the night was filled with gunfire. “I parked my bike at Tiananmen, and the People's Liberation Army soon arrived from the other direction”,[15] he said. “Troops marched along the main roads surrounding central Tiananmen Square, sometimes firing in the air and sometimes firing directly at crowds of men and women who refused to move out of the way”.[16] In the beginning Kristof was surprised, but later he realized that everything was real: “at first I thought these were blanks, but then the night echoed with screams and people began to crumple”.[17]
After he spent several hours in Tiananmen Square, talking with a few eyewitnesses, Kristof went back to his apartment to analyze everything that had happened in the square and around it. In the following days, he sent a story to his editors with the headline “Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and Crush Beijing Protest”. Kristof’s story about the occurrence in Tiananmen Square began as follows:
Tens of thousands of Chinese troops retook the center of the capital early this morning from pro-democracy protesters, killing scores of students and workers and wounding hundreds more as they fired submachine guns at crowds of people who tried to resist.
Troops marched along the main roads surrounding central Tiananmen Square, sometimes firing in the air and sometimes firing directly at crowds of men and women who refused to move out of the way.
Early this morning, the troops finally cleared the square after first sweeping the area around it. Several thousand students who had remained on the square throughout the shooting left peacefully, still waving the banners of their universities. Several armed personnel carriers ran over their tents and destroyed the encampment.
THE REPORT OF NICHOLAS KRISTOF
Although The New York Times had already published the article about the event in Tiananmen Square,[18] the reporter Nicholas Kristof sent a very challenging story of these occurrences.Kristof’s report of Tiananmen Square was based on what he saw by himself; on the testimony of others, including doctors, who saw what happened at crucial moments; and information from hospitals (he visited hospitals by himself).
After gathering ‘enough’ evidence, he wrote an article about this occurrence. He knew that The New York Times had published a story based on the testimony of ‘eyewitness’; according to that story the number of casualties was “several hundreds during the first hours of crackdown”.[19]Kristof sent the story to his editors for publishing. “I had so many years experience in journalism and I hardly decided to send it”,[20] he said. “I didn’t know what impact it would have, how my editors would accept it”.[21]
Bernie Gwertzman,[22] at that time deputy foreign editor of The New York Times and later foreign editor, firstly was very suspicious about the article. But The New York Times as New York Times is always opened for corrections. The newspaper always corrects itself: “remember Jayson Blair’s scandal”.[23] Therefore, they trusted him and they published his story.
In his article and later in his book, Kristof estimated that “between 400 and 800 people died in Tiananmen Square, many of them students and they remain ‘the elephant in the room of Chinese politics’”.[24]He also reported about the students’ violent actions. “Students and workers tried to resist the crackdown, and destroyed at least 16 trucks and 2 armored personnel carriers”,[25] he wrote. “The drivers escaped, but were beaten by students. A young American man, who could not be immediately identified, was also beaten by the crowd after he tried to intervene and protect one of the drivers”.[26]
REACTIONS TO THE COVERAGE
The impact of The New York Times coverage of the Beijing spring influenced media’s coverage in Panama, Eastern Europe, the Persian Gulf and the former Soviet Union in a number of ways. “Violence and repression had been covered before, but seldom reported in very detailed way”.[27]The coverage of Tiananmen Square’s event had an impact on Chinese society also. An interesting Chinese view came from young journalist Yeng Louqi, who wrote: “The U.S. media, in particular The New York Times, deserve real credit.... It brought Tiananmen to the entire world, and Tiananmen was a foreplay of the changes that later occurred in the communist countries”.[28]
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the answer to the question raised in the beginning, did Nicholas Kristof take the right step in acquiring the most accurate information by challenging even its own editors?, is yes, yes indeed. Kristof did the right step when he decided to look for more accurate information, and all journalists should do that. They should explore problems in very detailed and unbiased way.Nicholas Kristof was rewarded one year later. “In 1990 Nicholas Kristof and his wife, Sheryl WuDunn, also a Times journalist, won the Pulitzer Prize for their coverage of China's Tiananmen Square democracy movement”.[29] A new era in journalism starts with them; “they were the first married couple to win the Pulitzer Price for journalism”.[30]
NOTES:[1] Columnist Biography: Nicholas Kristof. http://www.nytimes.com/ref/KRISTOF-BIO.html (last time visited: 20.04.2006)
[2] Ibid.
[3] Nan Lin. The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement. Praeger Publishers. Westport CT. 1992, pg. 144-145
[4] Albert Chang. Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident: A Distorted Image Both Sides of the Lens, pg. 10-11. http://www.standford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china1.pdf (last time visited: 17.04.2006)[5] Andy McInerney. History Clarifies What Happened in 1989. http//www.workers.org/ww/tienanmen.html (last time visited: 15.04.2006)[6] Theodore Han & John Li: Tiananmen Square, Spring 1989: A Chronology of the Chinese Democracy Movement. Institute of East Asian Studies – Univerity of California; Berkley, CA. 1992, pg. 20-24.[7] Independent Television Service (ITVS). The Gate of Heavenly Peace. http://www.tsquare.tv/film/transjune4.html. (last time visited: 20.04.2006)[8] Theodore Han & John Li: Tiananmen Square, Spring 1989: A Chronology of the Chinese Democracy Movement. Institute of East Asian Studies – University of California; Berkley, CA. 1992, pg. 9-11.[9] Robin Munro. “Who died in Beijing and Why?” The Nation. Volume 250. Issue: 23. June 11, 1990. The Nation Company LP, pg. 811[10] Ibid.[11] Robin Munro. “Who died in Beijing and Why?” The Nation. Volume 250. Issue: 23. June 11, 1990. The Nation Company LP, pg. 811[12] Elaine Chan. Sacredness and the Ritual Process in Collective Action: the 1989 Chinese Student Movement. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Volume. 31. Issue: 1. 1999, pg. 3[13] Nicholas Kristof. “The Tiananmen Victory”. The New York Times. June 2, 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/opinion/02KRIS.html?ex=1401508800&en=ced9a0581a266afc&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[14] Ibid.[15] Ibid.[16] Nicholas Kristof. “Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and Crush Beijing Protest”. New York Times. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/chincrac.htm. (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[17] Nicholas Kristof. The Tiananmen Victory. The New York Times. June 2, 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/opinion/02KRIS.html?ex=1401508800&en=ced9a0581a266afc&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[18] Albert Chang. Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident: A Distorted Image Both Sides of the Lens, pg. 13-15. http://www.standford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china1.pdf (last time visited: 17.04.2006)[19] Ibid.[20] Nicholas Kristof. “The Tiananmen Victory”. The New York Times. June 2, 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/opinion/02KRIS.html?ex=1401508800&en=ced9a0581a266afc&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[21] Ibid.[22] During his 6 years as foreign editor The NYT won four Pulitzer Prices for international coverage[23] For more information: http://www.rediff.com/us/june/05nyt.htm (last time visited: 25.04.2006)[24] Nicholas Kristof. “The Tiananmen Victory”. The New York Times. June 2, 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/opinion/02KRIS.html?ex=1401508800&en=ced9a0581a266afc&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[25] Nicholas Kristof. “Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and Crush Beijing Protest”. New York Times. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/chincrac.htm. (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[26] Ibid.[27] Marvin Kalb. Turmoil at Tiananmen: A Study of U.S. Coverage of the Beijing Spring of 1989. http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/Tatintro.html#anchor415747 (last time visited: 21.04.2006)[28] Ibid.[29] Columnist Biography: Nicholas Kristof. http://www.nytimes.com/ref/KRISTOF-BIO.html (last time visited: 20.04.2006)[30] Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHYChang, Albert. Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident: A Distorted Image Both Sides of the Lens. http://www.standford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/china1.pdf (last time visited: 17.04.2006)Kristof, Nicholas. Columnist Biography. http://www.nytimes.com/ref/KRISTOF-BIO.html (last time visited: 20.04.2006)Independent Television Service (ITVS). The Gate of Heavenly Peace. http://www.tsquare.tv/film/transjune4.html. (last time visited: 20.04.2006)Kalb, Marvin. Turmoil at Tiananmen: A Study of U.S. Coverage of the Beijing Spring of 1989. http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/Tatintro.html#anchor415747 (last time visited: 21.04.2006)Kristof, Nicholas. “Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and Crush Beijing Protest”. New York Times.http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/chincrac.htm. (last time visited: 21.04.2006)Nicholas, Kristof. “The Tiananmen Victory”. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/opinion/02KRIS.html?ex=1401508800&en=ced9a0581a266afc&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND (last time visited: 21.04.2006)McInerney, Andy. History Clarifies What Happened in 1989. http//www.workers.org/ww/tienanmen.html (last time visited: 15.04.2006)Sources from Questia Online LibraryHan, Theodore & John Li: Tiananmen Square, Spring 1989: A Chronology of the Chinese Democracy Movment. Institute of East Asian Studies – University of California; Berkley, CA. 1992.Lin, Nan. The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement. Praeger Publishers. Westport CT. 1992.Munro, Robin. “Who died in Beijing and Why”? The Nation. Volume 250. Issue: 23. The Nation Company LP. 1990.
Love beyond Law
By S. Zizek( Slovenian Philosopher)
The Lacanian Subject not only provides an excellent introduction into the fundamental coordinates of Jacques Lacan's conceptual network; it also proposes original solutions to (or at least clarifications of) some of the crucial dilemmas left open by Lacan's work. The principal two among them are the notion of "love beyond Law" mentioned by Lacan in the very last page of his Seminar XI, (1) and the no less enigmatic thesis of the late Lacan according to which, at the end of psychoanalytic treatment, the subject becomes its own cause. Since these two points run against the predominant doxa on Lacan (love as a narcissistic misrecognition which obscures the truth of desire; the irreducibly decentred status of the subject), it is well worth the while to elaborate them.
"Love beyond Law" involves a "feminine" sublimation of drives into love. As Bruce Fink emphasizes again and again, love is here no longer merely a narcissistic (mis)recognition to be opposed to desire as the subject's 'truth' but a unique case of direct asexual sublimation (integration into the order of the signifier) of drives, of their jouissance, in the guise of the asexual Thing (music, religion, etc.) experienced in the ecstatic surrender. (2) What one should bear in mind apropos of this love beyond Law, this direct asexual sublimation of drive, is that it is inherently nonsensical, beyond meaning: meaning can only take place within the (symbolic) Law; the moment we trespass the domain of Law, meaning changes into enjoy-meant, jouis-sense.(3)
Insofar as, according to Lacan, at the conclusion of psychoanalytic treatment, the subject assumes the drive beyond fantasy and beyond (the Law of) desire, this problematic also compels us to confront the question of the conclusion of treatment in all its urgency. If we discard the discredited standard formulas ("reintegration into the symbolic space", etc.), only two options remain open: desire or drive. That is to say, either we conceive the conclusion of treatment as the assertion of the subject's radical openness to the enigma of the Other's desire no longer veiled by fantasmatic formations, or we risk the step beyond desire itself and adopt the position of the saint who is no longer bothered by the Other's desire as its decentred cause. In the case of the saint, the subject, in an unheard-of way, "causes itself", becomes its own cause. Its cause is no longer decentred, i.e., the enigma of the Other's desire no longer has any hold over it. How are we to understand this strange reversal on which Fink is quite justified to insist? In principle, things are clear enough: by way of positing itself as its own cause, the subject fully assumes the fact that the object-cause of its desire is not a cause that precedes its effects but is retroactively posited by the network of its effects: an event is never simply in itself traumatic, it only becomes a trauma retroactively, by being 'secreted' from the subject's symbolic space as its inassimilable point of reference. In this precise sense, the subject "causes itself" by way of retroactively positing that X which acts as the object-cause of its desire. This loop is constitutive of the subject. That is, an entity that does not 'cause itself' is precisely not a subject but an object. (4) However, one should avoid conceiving this assumption as a kind of symbolic integration of the decentred Real, whereby the subject 'symbolizes', assumes as an act of its free choice, the imposed trauma of the contingent encounter with the Real. One should always bear in mind that the status of the subject as such is hysterical: the subject 'is' only insofar as it confronts the enigma of Che vuoi? - "What do you want?" - insofar as the Other's desire remains impenetrable, insofar as the subject doesn't know what kind of object it is for the Other. Suspending this decentring of the cause is thus strictly equivalent to what Lacan called "subjective destitution", the de- hystericization by means of which the subject loses its status as subject.
The most elementary matrix of fantasy, of its temporal loop, is that of the "impossible" gaze by means of which the subject is present at the act of his/her own conception. What is at stake in it is the enigma of the Other's desire: by means of the fantasy-formation, the subject provides an answer to the question, 'What am I for my parents, for their desire?' and thus endeavors to arrive at the 'deeper meaning' of his or her existence, to discern the Fate involved in it. The reassuring lesson of fantasy is that "I was brought about with a special purpose".(5) Consequently, when, at the end of psychoanalytic treatment, I "traverse my fundamental fantasy", the point of it is not that, instead of being bothered by the enigma of the Other's desire, of what I am for the others, I "subjectivize" my fate in the sense of its symbolization, of recognizing myself in a symbolic network or narrative for which I am fully responsible, but rather that I fully assume the uttermost contingency of my being. The subject becomes 'cause of itself' in the sense of no longer looking for a guarantee of his or her existence in another's desire.
Another way to put it is to say that the "subjective destitution" changes the register from desire to drive. Desire is historical and subjectivized, always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from one object to another, since I do not actually desire what I want. What I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the dreaded moment of its satisfaction. Drive, on the other hand, involves a kind of inert satisfaction which always finds its way. Drive is non-subjectivized ("acephalic"); perhaps its paradigmatic expressions are the repulsive private rituals (sniffing one's own sweat, sticking one's finger into one's nose, etc.) that bring us intense satisfaction without our being aware of it-or, insofar as we are aware of it, without our being able to do anything to prevent it.
In Andersen's fairy tale The Red Shoes, an impoverished young woman puts on a pair of magical shoes and almost dies when her feet won't stop dancing. She is only saved when an executioner cuts off her feet with his axe. Her still-shod feet dance on, whereas she is given wooden feet and finds peace in religion. These shoes stand for drive at its purest: an 'undead' partial object that functions as a kind of impersonal willing: 'it wants', it persists in its repetitive movement (of dancing), it follows its path and exacts its satisfaction at any price, irrespective of the subject's well-being. This drive is that which is 'in the subject more than herself': although the subject cannot ever 'subjectivize' it, assume it as 'her own' by way of saying 'It is I who want to do this!' it nonetheless operates in her very kernel. (6) As Fink's book reminds us, Lacan's wager is that it is possible to sublimate this dull satisfaction. This is what, ultimately, art and religion are about.
----------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 263-76.
2 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-73 (Encore), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 64-89.
3 It is at this point that Peter Dews' attempt to enlist the Lacanian problematic of 'love beyond Law' into his project of the 'return to meaning' (see his The Limits of Disenchantment, London and New York: Verso, 1996) falls short: it has to overlook the radical incompatibility of 'love beyond Law' and the field of meaning - i.e., the fact that within the Lacanian conceptual edifice, 'love beyond Law' entails the eclipse of meaning in jouis-sense.
4 As to this paradoxical status of trauma, see Slavoj Zizek, Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 29-53.
5 We can see, now, in what precise sense a pervert lives his fantasy: in clear contrast to the hysteric (neurotic), the pervert doesn't have any doubt as to what he is for the big Other's desire: he is the instrument of the Other's enjoyment. A simple, but nonetheless poignant, expression of this perverse attitude is found in Hugh Hudson's Chariots of Fire, when the devout Eric Liddel explains his fast running which brought him a gold medal at the 1924 Paris Olympics: "God made me for a purpose, but He also made me fast. And when I run, I feel His pleasure."
6 One should mention here Michael Powell's The Red Shoes, a suicidal variation of the same motif. At the end of the film, the shoes the young ballerina is wearing also take on a life of their own. However, since there is no one there to cut her legs off the shoes carry the ballerina out onto a high balcony from which she is forced to leap onto the railroad tracks where she is hit by a train. The crucial thing this cinematic version adds to Andersen's fairy tale is the opposition between the 'partial drive' embodied in the shoes and the normal sexual desire, i.e., the girl's sexual interest in her partner.
The Lacanian Subject not only provides an excellent introduction into the fundamental coordinates of Jacques Lacan's conceptual network; it also proposes original solutions to (or at least clarifications of) some of the crucial dilemmas left open by Lacan's work. The principal two among them are the notion of "love beyond Law" mentioned by Lacan in the very last page of his Seminar XI, (1) and the no less enigmatic thesis of the late Lacan according to which, at the end of psychoanalytic treatment, the subject becomes its own cause. Since these two points run against the predominant doxa on Lacan (love as a narcissistic misrecognition which obscures the truth of desire; the irreducibly decentred status of the subject), it is well worth the while to elaborate them.
"Love beyond Law" involves a "feminine" sublimation of drives into love. As Bruce Fink emphasizes again and again, love is here no longer merely a narcissistic (mis)recognition to be opposed to desire as the subject's 'truth' but a unique case of direct asexual sublimation (integration into the order of the signifier) of drives, of their jouissance, in the guise of the asexual Thing (music, religion, etc.) experienced in the ecstatic surrender. (2) What one should bear in mind apropos of this love beyond Law, this direct asexual sublimation of drive, is that it is inherently nonsensical, beyond meaning: meaning can only take place within the (symbolic) Law; the moment we trespass the domain of Law, meaning changes into enjoy-meant, jouis-sense.(3)
Insofar as, according to Lacan, at the conclusion of psychoanalytic treatment, the subject assumes the drive beyond fantasy and beyond (the Law of) desire, this problematic also compels us to confront the question of the conclusion of treatment in all its urgency. If we discard the discredited standard formulas ("reintegration into the symbolic space", etc.), only two options remain open: desire or drive. That is to say, either we conceive the conclusion of treatment as the assertion of the subject's radical openness to the enigma of the Other's desire no longer veiled by fantasmatic formations, or we risk the step beyond desire itself and adopt the position of the saint who is no longer bothered by the Other's desire as its decentred cause. In the case of the saint, the subject, in an unheard-of way, "causes itself", becomes its own cause. Its cause is no longer decentred, i.e., the enigma of the Other's desire no longer has any hold over it. How are we to understand this strange reversal on which Fink is quite justified to insist? In principle, things are clear enough: by way of positing itself as its own cause, the subject fully assumes the fact that the object-cause of its desire is not a cause that precedes its effects but is retroactively posited by the network of its effects: an event is never simply in itself traumatic, it only becomes a trauma retroactively, by being 'secreted' from the subject's symbolic space as its inassimilable point of reference. In this precise sense, the subject "causes itself" by way of retroactively positing that X which acts as the object-cause of its desire. This loop is constitutive of the subject. That is, an entity that does not 'cause itself' is precisely not a subject but an object. (4) However, one should avoid conceiving this assumption as a kind of symbolic integration of the decentred Real, whereby the subject 'symbolizes', assumes as an act of its free choice, the imposed trauma of the contingent encounter with the Real. One should always bear in mind that the status of the subject as such is hysterical: the subject 'is' only insofar as it confronts the enigma of Che vuoi? - "What do you want?" - insofar as the Other's desire remains impenetrable, insofar as the subject doesn't know what kind of object it is for the Other. Suspending this decentring of the cause is thus strictly equivalent to what Lacan called "subjective destitution", the de- hystericization by means of which the subject loses its status as subject.
The most elementary matrix of fantasy, of its temporal loop, is that of the "impossible" gaze by means of which the subject is present at the act of his/her own conception. What is at stake in it is the enigma of the Other's desire: by means of the fantasy-formation, the subject provides an answer to the question, 'What am I for my parents, for their desire?' and thus endeavors to arrive at the 'deeper meaning' of his or her existence, to discern the Fate involved in it. The reassuring lesson of fantasy is that "I was brought about with a special purpose".(5) Consequently, when, at the end of psychoanalytic treatment, I "traverse my fundamental fantasy", the point of it is not that, instead of being bothered by the enigma of the Other's desire, of what I am for the others, I "subjectivize" my fate in the sense of its symbolization, of recognizing myself in a symbolic network or narrative for which I am fully responsible, but rather that I fully assume the uttermost contingency of my being. The subject becomes 'cause of itself' in the sense of no longer looking for a guarantee of his or her existence in another's desire.
Another way to put it is to say that the "subjective destitution" changes the register from desire to drive. Desire is historical and subjectivized, always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from one object to another, since I do not actually desire what I want. What I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the dreaded moment of its satisfaction. Drive, on the other hand, involves a kind of inert satisfaction which always finds its way. Drive is non-subjectivized ("acephalic"); perhaps its paradigmatic expressions are the repulsive private rituals (sniffing one's own sweat, sticking one's finger into one's nose, etc.) that bring us intense satisfaction without our being aware of it-or, insofar as we are aware of it, without our being able to do anything to prevent it.
In Andersen's fairy tale The Red Shoes, an impoverished young woman puts on a pair of magical shoes and almost dies when her feet won't stop dancing. She is only saved when an executioner cuts off her feet with his axe. Her still-shod feet dance on, whereas she is given wooden feet and finds peace in religion. These shoes stand for drive at its purest: an 'undead' partial object that functions as a kind of impersonal willing: 'it wants', it persists in its repetitive movement (of dancing), it follows its path and exacts its satisfaction at any price, irrespective of the subject's well-being. This drive is that which is 'in the subject more than herself': although the subject cannot ever 'subjectivize' it, assume it as 'her own' by way of saying 'It is I who want to do this!' it nonetheless operates in her very kernel. (6) As Fink's book reminds us, Lacan's wager is that it is possible to sublimate this dull satisfaction. This is what, ultimately, art and religion are about.
----------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 263-76.
2 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-73 (Encore), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 64-89.
3 It is at this point that Peter Dews' attempt to enlist the Lacanian problematic of 'love beyond Law' into his project of the 'return to meaning' (see his The Limits of Disenchantment, London and New York: Verso, 1996) falls short: it has to overlook the radical incompatibility of 'love beyond Law' and the field of meaning - i.e., the fact that within the Lacanian conceptual edifice, 'love beyond Law' entails the eclipse of meaning in jouis-sense.
4 As to this paradoxical status of trauma, see Slavoj Zizek, Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 29-53.
5 We can see, now, in what precise sense a pervert lives his fantasy: in clear contrast to the hysteric (neurotic), the pervert doesn't have any doubt as to what he is for the big Other's desire: he is the instrument of the Other's enjoyment. A simple, but nonetheless poignant, expression of this perverse attitude is found in Hugh Hudson's Chariots of Fire, when the devout Eric Liddel explains his fast running which brought him a gold medal at the 1924 Paris Olympics: "God made me for a purpose, but He also made me fast. And when I run, I feel His pleasure."
6 One should mention here Michael Powell's The Red Shoes, a suicidal variation of the same motif. At the end of the film, the shoes the young ballerina is wearing also take on a life of their own. However, since there is no one there to cut her legs off the shoes carry the ballerina out onto a high balcony from which she is forced to leap onto the railroad tracks where she is hit by a train. The crucial thing this cinematic version adds to Andersen's fairy tale is the opposition between the 'partial drive' embodied in the shoes and the normal sexual desire, i.e., the girl's sexual interest in her partner.
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